eap_fast.c

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/*
 *   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
 *   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
 *   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at
 *   your option) any later version.
 *
 *   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
 *   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 *   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
 *   GNU General Public License for more details.
 *
 *   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
 *   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
 *   Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
 */
 
/**
 * $Id: 96376cd812b1e92fa424a1b21d95eb1681626073 $
 * @file eap_fast.c
 * @brief Contains the interfaces that are called from the main handler
 *
 * @author Alexander Clouter (alex@digriz.org.uk)
 
 * @copyright 2016 Alan DeKok (aland@freeradius.org)
 * @copyright 2016 The FreeRADIUS server project
 */
RCSID("$Id: 96376cd812b1e92fa424a1b21d95eb1681626073 $")
 
#include "eap_fast.h"
#include "eap_fast_crypto.h"
#include <freeradius-devel/tls/utils.h>
#include <freeradius-devel/util/sha1.h>
#include <freeradius-devel/tls/openssl_user_macros.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
 
#define RANDFILL(x) do { fr_assert(sizeof(x) % sizeof(uint32_t) == 0); for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(x); i += sizeof(uint32_t)) *((uint32_t *)&x[i]) = fr_rand(); } while(0)
 
/**
 * RFC 4851 section 5.1 - EAP-FAST Authentication Phase 1: Key Derivations
 */
static void eap_fast_init_keys(request_t *request, fr_tls_session_t *tls_session)
{
        eap_fast_tunnel_t *t = talloc_get_type_abort(tls_session->opaque, eap_fast_tunnel_t);
        uint8_t *buf;
        uint8_t *scratch;
        size_t ksize;
 
        RDEBUG2("Deriving EAP-FAST keys");
 
        fr_assert(t->s_imck == NULL);
 
        ksize = fr_tls_utils_keyblock_size_get(request, tls_session->ssl);
        fr_assert(ksize > 0);
        buf = talloc_array(request, uint8_t, ksize + sizeof(*t->keyblock));
        scratch = talloc_array(request, uint8_t, ksize + sizeof(*t->keyblock));
 
        t->keyblock = talloc(t, eap_fast_keyblock_t);
 
        eap_fast_tls_gen_challenge(tls_session->ssl, buf, scratch, ksize + sizeof(*t->keyblock), "key expansion");
        memcpy(t->keyblock, &buf[ksize], sizeof(*t->keyblock));
        memset(buf, 0, ksize + sizeof(*t->keyblock));
 
        t->s_imck = talloc_array(t, uint8_t, EAP_FAST_SIMCK_LEN);
        memcpy(t->s_imck, t->keyblock, EAP_FAST_SKS_LEN);       /* S-IMCK[0] = session_key_seed */
 
        t->cmk = talloc_array(t, uint8_t, EAP_FAST_CMK_LEN);    /* note that CMK[0] is not defined */
        t->imck_count = 0;
 
        talloc_free(buf);
        talloc_free(scratch);
}
 
/**
 * RFC 4851 section 5.2 - Intermediate Compound Key Derivations
 */
static void eap_fast_update_icmk(request_t *request, fr_tls_session_t *tls_session, uint8_t *msk)
{
        eap_fast_tunnel_t *t = talloc_get_type_abort(tls_session->opaque, eap_fast_tunnel_t);
        uint8_t imck[EAP_FAST_SIMCK_LEN + EAP_FAST_CMK_LEN];
 
        RDEBUG2("Updating ICMK");
 
        T_PRF(t->s_imck, EAP_FAST_SIMCK_LEN, "Inner Methods Compound Keys", msk, 32, imck, sizeof(imck));       //-V512
 
        memcpy(t->s_imck, imck, EAP_FAST_SIMCK_LEN);
        RHEXDUMP3(t->s_imck, EAP_FAST_SIMCK_LEN, "S-IMCK[j]");
 
        memcpy(t->cmk, &imck[EAP_FAST_SIMCK_LEN], EAP_FAST_CMK_LEN);
        RHEXDUMP3(t->cmk, EAP_FAST_CMK_LEN, "CMK[j]");
 
        t->imck_count++;
 
        /*
         * Calculate MSK/EMSK at the same time as they are coupled to ICMK
         *
         * RFC 4851 section 5.4 - EAP Master Session Key Generation
         */
        t->msk = talloc_array(t, uint8_t, EAP_FAST_KEY_LEN);
        T_PRF(t->s_imck, EAP_FAST_SIMCK_LEN, "Session Key Generating Function", NULL, 0, t->msk, EAP_FAST_KEY_LEN);
        RHEXDUMP3(t->msk, EAP_FAST_KEY_LEN, "MSK");
 
        t->emsk = talloc_array(t, uint8_t, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
        T_PRF(t->s_imck, EAP_FAST_SIMCK_LEN, "Extended Session Key Generating Function", NULL, 0, t->emsk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
        RHEXDUMP3(t->emsk, EAP_EMSK_LEN, "EMSK");
}
 
void eap_fast_tlv_append(fr_tls_session_t *tls_session, fr_dict_attr_t const *tlv, bool mandatory, int length, void const *data)
{
        uint16_t hdr[2];
 
        hdr[0] = (mandatory) ? htons(tlv->attr | EAP_FAST_TLV_MANDATORY) : htons(tlv->attr);
        hdr[1] = htons(length);
 
        tls_session->record_from_buff(&tls_session->clean_in, &hdr, 4);
        tls_session->record_from_buff(&tls_session->clean_in, data, length);
}
 
static void eap_fast_send_error(fr_tls_session_t *tls_session, int error)
{
        uint32_t value;
        value = htonl(error);
 
        eap_fast_tlv_append(tls_session, attr_eap_fast_error, true, sizeof(value), &value);
}
 
static void eap_fast_append_result(fr_tls_session_t *tls_session, fr_radius_packet_code_t code)
{
        eap_fast_tunnel_t       *t = talloc_get_type_abort(tls_session->opaque, eap_fast_tunnel_t);
        uint16_t                state;
        fr_dict_attr_t const    *da;
 
 
        da = (t->result_final) ? attr_eap_fast_result : attr_eap_fast_intermediate_result;
        state = htons((code == FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT) ? EAP_FAST_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE : EAP_FAST_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS);
 
        eap_fast_tlv_append(tls_session, da, true, sizeof(state), &state);
}
 
static void eap_fast_send_identity_request(request_t *request, fr_tls_session_t *tls_session, eap_session_t *eap_session)
{
        eap_packet_raw_t eap_packet;
 
        RDEBUG2("Sending EAP-Identity");
 
        eap_packet.code = FR_EAP_CODE_REQUEST;
        eap_packet.id = eap_session->this_round->response->id + 1;
        eap_packet.length[0] = 0;
        eap_packet.length[1] = EAP_HEADER_LEN + 1;
        eap_packet.data[0] = FR_EAP_METHOD_IDENTITY;
 
        eap_fast_tlv_append(tls_session, attr_eap_fast_eap_payload, true, sizeof(eap_packet), &eap_packet);
}
 
static void eap_fast_send_pac_tunnel(request_t *request, fr_tls_session_t *tls_session)
{
        eap_fast_tunnel_t                       *t = talloc_get_type_abort(tls_session->opaque, eap_fast_tunnel_t);
        eap_fast_pac_t                          pac;
        eap_fast_attr_pac_opaque_plaintext_t    opaque_plaintext;
        int                                     alen, dlen;
 
        memset(&pac, 0, sizeof(pac));
        memset(&opaque_plaintext, 0, sizeof(opaque_plaintext));
 
        RDEBUG2("Sending Tunnel PAC");
 
        pac.key.hdr.type = htons(EAP_FAST_TLV_MANDATORY | attr_eap_fast_pac_key->attr);
        pac.key.hdr.length = htons(sizeof(pac.key.data));
        fr_assert(sizeof(pac.key.data) % sizeof(uint32_t) == 0);
        RANDFILL(pac.key.data);
 
        pac.info.lifetime.hdr.type = htons(attr_eap_fast_pac_info_pac_lifetime->attr);
        pac.info.lifetime.hdr.length = htons(sizeof(pac.info.lifetime.data));
        pac.info.lifetime.data = htonl(fr_time_to_sec(fr_time_add(request->packet->timestamp, t->pac_lifetime)));
 
        pac.info.a_id.hdr.type = htons(EAP_FAST_TLV_MANDATORY | attr_eap_fast_pac_a_id->attr);
        pac.info.a_id.hdr.length = htons(sizeof(pac.info.a_id.data));
        memcpy(pac.info.a_id.data, t->a_id, sizeof(pac.info.a_id.data));
 
        pac.info.a_id_info.hdr.type = htons(attr_eap_fast_pac_a_id->attr);
        pac.info.a_id_info.hdr.length = htons(sizeof(pac.info.a_id_info.data));
 
#define MIN(a,b) (((a)>(b)) ? (b) : (a))
        alen = MIN(talloc_array_length(t->authority_identity) - 1, sizeof(pac.info.a_id_info.data));
        memcpy(pac.info.a_id_info.data, t->authority_identity, alen);
 
        pac.info.type.hdr.type = htons(EAP_FAST_TLV_MANDATORY | attr_eap_fast_pac_info_pac_type->attr);
        pac.info.type.hdr.length = htons(sizeof(pac.info.type.data));
        pac.info.type.data = htons(PAC_TYPE_TUNNEL);
 
        pac.info.hdr.type = htons(EAP_FAST_TLV_MANDATORY | attr_eap_fast_pac_info_tlv->attr);
        pac.info.hdr.length = htons(sizeof(pac.info.lifetime)
                                + sizeof(pac.info.a_id)
                                + sizeof(pac.info.a_id_info)
                                + sizeof(pac.info.type));
 
        memcpy(&opaque_plaintext.type, &pac.info.type, sizeof(opaque_plaintext.type));
        memcpy(&opaque_plaintext.lifetime, &pac.info.lifetime, sizeof(opaque_plaintext.lifetime));
        memcpy(&opaque_plaintext.key, &pac.key, sizeof(opaque_plaintext.key));
 
        RHEXDUMP3((uint8_t const *)&opaque_plaintext, sizeof(opaque_plaintext), "PAC-Opaque plaintext data section");
 
        fr_assert(PAC_A_ID_LENGTH <= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
        memcpy(pac.opaque.aad, t->a_id, PAC_A_ID_LENGTH);
        fr_assert(RAND_bytes(pac.opaque.iv, sizeof(pac.opaque.iv)) != 0);
        dlen = eap_fast_encrypt((unsigned const char *)&opaque_plaintext, sizeof(opaque_plaintext),
                                    t->a_id, PAC_A_ID_LENGTH, t->pac_opaque_key, pac.opaque.iv,
                                    pac.opaque.data, pac.opaque.tag);
 
        pac.opaque.hdr.type = htons(EAP_FAST_TLV_MANDATORY | attr_eap_fast_pac_opaque_tlv->attr);
        pac.opaque.hdr.length = htons(sizeof(pac.opaque) - sizeof(pac.opaque.hdr) - sizeof(pac.opaque.data) + dlen);
        RHEXDUMP3((uint8_t const *)&pac.opaque, sizeof(pac.opaque) - sizeof(pac.opaque.data) + dlen, "PAC-Opaque");
 
        eap_fast_tlv_append(tls_session, attr_eap_fast_pac_tlv, true, sizeof(pac) - sizeof(pac.opaque.data) + dlen, &pac);
}
 
static void eap_fast_append_crypto_binding(request_t *request, fr_tls_session_t *tls_session)
{
        eap_fast_tunnel_t               *t = talloc_get_type_abort(tls_session->opaque, eap_fast_tunnel_t);
        eap_tlv_crypto_binding_tlv_t    binding = {0};
        int const                       len = sizeof(binding) - (&binding.reserved - (uint8_t *)&binding);
 
        RDEBUG2("Sending Cryptobinding");
 
        binding.tlv_type = htons(EAP_FAST_TLV_MANDATORY | attr_eap_fast_crypto_binding->attr);
        binding.length = htons(len);
        binding.version = EAP_FAST_VERSION;
        binding.received_version = EAP_FAST_VERSION;    /* FIXME use the clients value */
        binding.subtype = EAP_FAST_TLV_CRYPTO_BINDING_SUBTYPE_REQUEST;
 
        fr_assert(sizeof(binding.nonce) % sizeof(uint32_t) == 0);
        RANDFILL(binding.nonce);
        binding.nonce[sizeof(binding.nonce) - 1] &= ~0x01; /* RFC 4851 section 4.2.8 */
        RHEXDUMP3(binding.nonce, sizeof(binding.nonce), "NONCE");
 
        RHEXDUMP3((uint8_t const *) &binding, sizeof(binding), "Crypto-Binding TLV for Compound MAC calculation");
 
        fr_hmac_sha1(binding.compound_mac, (uint8_t *)&binding, sizeof(binding), t->cmk, EAP_FAST_CMK_LEN);
        RHEXDUMP3(binding.compound_mac, sizeof(binding.compound_mac), "Compound MAC");
 
        eap_fast_tlv_append(tls_session, attr_eap_fast_crypto_binding, true, len, &binding.reserved);
}
 
#define EAP_FAST_TLV_MAX 11
 
static int eap_fast_verify(request_t *request, fr_tls_session_t *tls_session, uint8_t const *data, unsigned int data_len)
{
        uint16_t attr;
        uint16_t length;
        unsigned int remaining = data_len;
        int     total = 0;
        int     num[EAP_FAST_TLV_MAX] = {0};
        eap_fast_tunnel_t *t = talloc_get_type_abort(tls_session->opaque, eap_fast_tunnel_t);
        uint32_t present = 0;
 
        fr_assert(sizeof(present) * 8 > EAP_FAST_TLV_MAX);
 
        while (remaining > 0) {
                if (remaining < 4) {
                        RDEBUG2("EAP-FAST TLV is too small (%u) to contain a EAP-FAST TLV header", remaining);
                        return 0;
                }
 
                memcpy(&attr, data, sizeof(attr));
                attr = ntohs(attr) & EAP_FAST_TLV_TYPE;
 
                if ((attr == attr_eap_fast_result->attr) ||
                    (attr == attr_eap_fast_nak->attr) ||
                    (attr == attr_eap_fast_error->attr) ||
                    (attr == attr_eap_fast_vendor_specific->attr) ||
                    (attr == attr_eap_fast_eap_payload->attr) ||
                    (attr == attr_eap_fast_intermediate_result->attr) ||
                    (attr == attr_eap_fast_pac_tlv->attr) ||
                    (attr == attr_eap_fast_crypto_binding->attr)) {
                        num[attr]++;
                        present |= 1 << attr;
 
                        if (num[attr_eap_fast_eap_payload->attr] > 1) {
                                REDEBUG("Too many EAP-Payload TLVs");
unexpected:
                                for (int i = 0; i < EAP_FAST_TLV_MAX; i++) {
                                        if (present & (1 << i)) RDEBUG2(" - attribute %d is present", i);
                                }
                                eap_fast_send_error(tls_session, EAP_FAST_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TLV);
                                return 0;
                        }
 
                        if (num[attr_eap_fast_intermediate_result->attr] > 1) {
                                REDEBUG("Too many Intermediate-Result TLVs");
                                goto unexpected;
                        }
                } else {
                        if ((data[0] & 0x80) != 0) {
                                REDEBUG("Unknown mandatory TLV %02x", attr);
                                goto unexpected;
                        }
 
                        num[0]++;
                }
 
                total++;
 
                memcpy(&length, data + 2, sizeof(length));
                length = ntohs(length);
 
                data += 4;
                remaining -= 4;
 
                if (length > remaining) {
                        RDEBUG2("EAP-FAST TLV %u is longer than room remaining in the packet (%u > %u).", attr,
                                length, remaining);
                        return 0;
                }
 
                /*
                 * If the rest of the TLVs are larger than
                 * this attribute, continue.
                 *
                 * Otherwise, if the attribute over-flows the end
                 * of the TLCs, die.
                 */
                if (remaining < length) {
                        RDEBUG2("EAP-FAST TLV overflows packet!");
                        return 0;
                }
 
                /*
                 * If there's an error, we bail out of the
                 * authentication process before allocating
                 * memory.
                 */
                if ((attr == attr_eap_fast_intermediate_result->attr) || (attr == attr_eap_fast_result->attr)) {
                        uint16_t status;
 
                        if (length < 2) {
                                REDEBUG("EAP-FAST TLV %u is too short.  Expected 2, got %d", attr, length);
                                return 0;
                        }
 
                        memcpy(&status, data, 2);
                        status = ntohs(status);
 
                        if (status == EAP_FAST_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE) {
                                REDEBUG("EAP-FAST TLV %u indicates failure.  Rejecting request", attr);
                                return 0;
                        }
 
                        if (status != EAP_FAST_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS) {
                                REDEBUG("EAP-FAST TLV %u contains unknown value.  Rejecting request", attr);
                                goto unexpected;
                        }
                }
 
                /*
                 * remaining > length, continue.
                 */
                remaining -= length;
                data += length;
        }
 
        /*
         * Check if the peer mixed & matched TLVs.
         */
        if ((num[attr_eap_fast_nak->attr] > 0) && (num[attr_eap_fast_nak->attr] != total)) {
                REDEBUG("NAK TLV sent with non-NAK TLVs.  Rejecting request");
                goto unexpected;
        }
 
        if (num[attr_eap_fast_intermediate_result->attr] > 0) {
                REDEBUG("NAK TLV sent with non-NAK TLVs.  Rejecting request");
                goto unexpected;
        }
 
        /*
         * Check mandatory or not mandatory TLVs.
         */
        switch (t->stage) {
        case EAP_FAST_TLS_SESSION_HANDSHAKE:
                if (present) {
                        REDEBUG("Unexpected TLVs in TLS Session Handshake stage");
                        goto unexpected;
                }
                break;
        case EAP_FAST_AUTHENTICATION:
                if (present != (uint32_t)(1 << attr_eap_fast_eap_payload->attr)) {
                        REDEBUG("Unexpected TLVs in authentication stage");
                        goto unexpected;
                }
                break;
        case EAP_FAST_CRYPTOBIND_CHECK:
        {
                uint32_t bits = (t->result_final)
                                ? 1 << attr_eap_fast_result->attr
                                : 1 << attr_eap_fast_intermediate_result->attr;
                if (present & ~(bits | (1 << attr_eap_fast_crypto_binding->attr) | (1 << attr_eap_fast_pac_tlv->attr))) {
                        REDEBUG("Unexpected TLVs in cryptobind checking stage");
                        goto unexpected;
                }
                break;
        }
        case EAP_FAST_PROVISIONING:
                if (present & ~((1 << attr_eap_fast_pac_tlv->attr) | (1 << attr_eap_fast_result->attr))) {
                        REDEBUG("Unexpected TLVs in provisioning stage");
                        goto unexpected;
                }
                break;
        case EAP_FAST_COMPLETE:
                if (present) {
                        REDEBUG("Unexpected TLVs in complete stage");
                        goto unexpected;
                }
                break;
        default:
                REDEBUG("Unexpected stage %d", t->stage);
                return 0;
        }
 
        /*
         * We got this far.  It looks OK.
         */
        return 1;
}
 
/**
 *
 * FIXME do something with mandatory
 */
ssize_t eap_fast_decode_pair(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, fr_pair_list_t *out, fr_dict_attr_t const *parent,
                             uint8_t const *data, size_t data_len,
                             void *decode_ctx)
{
        fr_dict_attr_t const    *da;
        uint8_t const           *p = data, *end = p + data_len;
 
        /*
         *      Decode the TLVs
         */
        while (p < end) {
                ssize_t         ret;
                uint16_t        attr;
                uint16_t        len;
                fr_pair_t       *vp;
 
                attr = fr_nbo_to_uint16(p) & EAP_FAST_TLV_TYPE;
                p += 2;
                len = fr_nbo_to_uint16(p);
                p += 2;
 
                da = fr_dict_attr_child_by_num(parent, attr);
                if (!da) {
                        MEM(vp = fr_pair_afrom_child_num(ctx, parent, attr));
 
                } else if (da->type == FR_TYPE_TLV) {
                        p += (size_t) eap_fast_decode_pair(ctx, out, parent, p, len, decode_ctx);
                        continue;
 
                } else {
                        MEM(vp = fr_pair_afrom_da(ctx, da));
                }
 
                ret = fr_value_box_from_network(vp, &vp->data, vp->vp_type, vp->da,
                                                &FR_DBUFF_TMP(p, (size_t)len), len, true);
                if (ret != len) {
                        fr_pair_raw_afrom_pair(vp, p, len);
                }
                fr_pair_append(out, vp);
                p += len;
        }
 
        return p - data;
}
 
 
/*
 * Use a reply packet to determine what to do.
 */
static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) process_reply(UNUSED eap_session_t *eap_session,
                                                  fr_tls_session_t *tls_session,
                                                  request_t *request,
                                                  fr_packet_t *reply, fr_pair_list_t *reply_list)
{
        rlm_rcode_t                     rcode = RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
        fr_pair_t                       *vp;
        fr_dcursor_t                    cursor;
 
        eap_fast_tunnel_t               *t = talloc_get_type_abort(tls_session->opaque, eap_fast_tunnel_t);
 
        /*
         * If the response packet was Access-Accept, then
         * we're OK.  If not, die horribly.
         *
         * FIXME: EAP-Messages can only start with 'identity',
         * NOT 'eap start', so we should check for that....
         */
        switch (reply->code) {
        case FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT:
                RDEBUG2("Got tunneled Access-Accept");
 
                rcode = RLM_MODULE_OK;
 
                /*
                 * Copy what we need into the TTLS tunnel and leave
                 * the rest to be cleaned up.
                 */
                for (vp = fr_pair_list_head(reply_list); vp; vp = fr_pair_list_next(reply_list, vp)) {
                        if (fr_dict_vendor_num_by_da(vp->da) != VENDORPEC_MICROSOFT) continue;
 
                        /* FIXME must be a better way to capture/re-derive this later for ISK */
                        switch (vp->da->attr) {
                        case FR_MSCHAP_MPPE_SEND_KEY:
                                if (vp->vp_length != MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
                                wrong_length:
                                        REDEBUG("Found %s with incorrect length.  Expected %u, got %zu",
                                                vp->da->name, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, vp->vp_length);
                                        rcode = RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
                                        break;
                                }
 
                                memcpy(t->isk.mppe_send, vp->vp_octets, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
                                break;
 
                        case FR_MSCHAP_MPPE_RECV_KEY:
                                if (vp->vp_length != MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) goto wrong_length;
                                memcpy(t->isk.mppe_recv, vp->vp_octets, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
                                break;
 
                        case FR_MSCHAP2_SUCCESS:
                                RDEBUG2("Got %s, tunneling it to the client in a challenge", vp->da->name);
                                rcode = RLM_MODULE_HANDLED;
                                t->authenticated = true;
                                break;
 
                        default:
                                break;
                        }
                }
                RHEXDUMP3((uint8_t *)&t->isk, 2 * MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, "ISK[j]"); /* FIXME (part of above) */
                break;
 
        case FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT:
                REDEBUG("Got tunneled Access-Reject");
                rcode = RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
                break;
 
        case FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
                RDEBUG2("Got tunneled Access-Challenge");
 
                /*
                 *      Copy the EAP-Message back to the tunnel.
                 */
 
                for (vp = fr_pair_dcursor_by_da_init(&cursor, reply_list, attr_eap_message);
                     vp;
                     vp = fr_dcursor_next(&cursor)) {
                        eap_fast_tlv_append(tls_session, attr_eap_fast_eap_payload, true, vp->vp_length, vp->vp_octets);
                }
 
                rcode = RLM_MODULE_HANDLED;
                break;
 
        default:
                REDEBUG("Unknown RADIUS packet type %d: rejecting tunneled user", reply->code);
                rcode = RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
                break;
        }
 
        return rcode;
}
 
static fr_radius_packet_code_t eap_fast_eap_payload(request_t *request, eap_session_t *eap_session,
                                    fr_tls_session_t *tls_session, fr_pair_t *tlv_eap_payload)
{
        fr_radius_packet_code_t                 code = FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT;
        rlm_rcode_t             rcode;
        fr_pair_t               *vp;
        eap_fast_tunnel_t       *t;
        request_t                       *fake;
 
        RDEBUG2("Processing received EAP Payload");
 
        /*
         *      Allocate a fake request_t structure.
         */
        fake = request_alloc_internal(request, &(request_init_args_t){ .parent = request });
        fr_assert(fr_pair_list_empty(&fake->request_pairs));
 
        t = talloc_get_type_abort(tls_session->opaque, eap_fast_tunnel_t);
 
        /*
         *      Add the tunneled attributes to the fake request.
         */
 
        MEM(vp = fr_pair_afrom_da(fake->request_ctx, attr_eap_message));
        fr_pair_append(&fake->request_pairs, vp);
        fr_pair_value_memdup(vp, tlv_eap_payload->vp_octets, tlv_eap_payload->vp_length, false);
 
        RDEBUG2("Got tunneled request");
        log_request_pair_list(L_DBG_LVL_1, fake, NULL, &fake->request_pairs, NULL);
 
        /*
         *      Tell the request that it's a fake one.
         */
        MEM(fr_pair_prepend_by_da(fake->request_ctx, &vp, &fake->request_pairs, attr_freeradius_proxied_to) >= 0);
        (void)fr_pair_value_from_str(vp, "127.0.0.1", sizeof("127.0.0.1") - 1, NULL, false);
 
        /*
         *      If there's no User-Name in the stored data, look for
         *      an EAP-Identity, and pull it out of there.
         */
        if (!t->username) {
                fr_assert(vp->da == attr_eap_message); /* cached from above */
 
                if ((vp->vp_length >= EAP_HEADER_LEN + 2) &&
                    (vp->vp_strvalue[0] == FR_EAP_CODE_RESPONSE) &&
                    (vp->vp_strvalue[EAP_HEADER_LEN] == FR_EAP_METHOD_IDENTITY) &&
                    (vp->vp_strvalue[EAP_HEADER_LEN + 1] != 0)) {
                        /*
                         *      Create and remember a User-Name
                         */
                        MEM(t->username = fr_pair_afrom_da(t, attr_user_name));
                        t->username->vp_tainted = true;
                        fr_pair_value_bstrndup(t->username, (char const *)vp->vp_octets + 5, vp->vp_length - 5, true);
 
                        RDEBUG2("Got tunneled identity of %pV", &t->username->data);
                } else {
                        /*
                         * Don't reject the request outright,
                         * as it's permitted to do EAP without
                         * user-name.
                         */
                        RWDEBUG2("No EAP-Identity found to start EAP conversation");
                }
        } /* else there WAS a t->username */
 
        if (t->username) {
                vp = fr_pair_copy(fake->request_ctx, t->username);
                fr_pair_append(&fake->request_pairs, vp);
        }
 
        if (t->stage == EAP_FAST_AUTHENTICATION) {      /* FIXME do this only for MSCHAPv2 */
                fr_pair_t *tvp;
 
                MEM(tvp = fr_pair_afrom_da(fake, attr_eap_type));
                tvp->vp_uint32 = t->default_provisioning_method;
                fr_pair_append(&fake->control_pairs, tvp);
 
                /*
                 * RFC 5422 section 3.2.3 - Authenticating Using EAP-FAST-MSCHAPv2
                 */
                if (t->mode == EAP_FAST_PROVISIONING_ANON) {
                        MEM(tvp = fr_pair_afrom_da(fake, attr_ms_chap_challenge));
                        fr_pair_value_memdup(tvp, t->keyblock->server_challenge, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, false);
                        fr_pair_append(&fake->control_pairs, tvp);
                        RHEXDUMP3(t->keyblock->server_challenge, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, "MSCHAPv2 auth_challenge");
 
                        MEM(tvp = fr_pair_afrom_da(fake, attr_ms_chap_peer_challenge));
                        fr_pair_value_memdup(tvp, t->keyblock->client_challenge, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, false);
                        fr_pair_append(&fake->control_pairs, tvp);
                        RHEXDUMP3(t->keyblock->client_challenge, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, "MSCHAPv2 peer_challenge");
                }
        }
 
        /*
         * Call authentication recursively, which will
         * do PAP, CHAP, MS-CHAP, etc.
         */
        eap_virtual_server(request, eap_session, t->virtual_server);
 
        /*
         * Decide what to do with the reply.
         */
        switch (fake->reply->code) {
        case 0:                 /* No reply code, must be proxied... */
#ifdef WITH_PROXY
                vp = fr_pair_find_by_da(&fake->control, NULL, attr_proxy_to_realm);
                if (vp) {
                        int                     ret;
                        eap_tunnel_data_t       *tunnel;
 
                        RDEBUG2("Tunneled authentication will be proxied to %pV", &vp->data);
 
                        /*
                         *      Tell the original request that it's going to be proxied.
                         */
                        fr_pair_list_copy_by_da(request->control_ctx, &request->control_pairs,
                                                &fake->control_pairs, attr_proxy_to_realm, 0);
 
                        /*
                         *      Seed the proxy packet with the tunneled request.
                         */
                        fr_assert(!request->proxy);
 
                        /*
                         *      FIXME: Actually proxy stuff
                         */
                        request->proxy = request_alloc_internal(request, &(request_init_args_t){ .parent = request });
 
                        request->proxy->packet = talloc_steal(request->proxy, fake->packet);
                        memset(&request->proxy->packet->src_ipaddr, 0,
                               sizeof(request->proxy->packet->src_ipaddr));
                        memset(&request->proxy->packet->src_ipaddr, 0,
                               sizeof(request->proxy->packet->src_ipaddr));
                        request->proxy->packet->src_port = 0;
                        request->proxy->packet->dst_port = 0;
                        fake->packet = NULL;
                        fr_packet_free(&fake->reply);
                        fake->reply = NULL;
 
                        /*
                         *      Set up the callbacks for the tunnel
                         */
                        tunnel = talloc_zero(request, eap_tunnel_data_t);
                        tunnel->tls_session = tls_session;
 
                        /*
                         *      Associate the callback with the request.
                         */
                        ret = request_data_add(request, request->proxy, REQUEST_DATA_EAP_TUNNEL_CALLBACK,
                                               tunnel, false, false, false);
                        fr_cond_assert(ret == 0);
 
                        /*
                         *      rlm_eap.c has taken care of associating the eap_session
                         *      with the fake request.
                         *
                         *      So we associate the fake request with this request.
                         */
                        ret = request_data_add(request, request->proxy, REQUEST_DATA_EAP_MSCHAP_TUNNEL_CALLBACK,
                                               fake, true, false, false);
                        fr_cond_assert(ret == 0);
 
                        fake = NULL;
 
                        /*
                         *      Didn't authenticate the packet, but we're proxying it.
                         */
                        code = FR_RADIUS_CODE_STATUS_CLIENT;
 
                } else
#endif  /* WITH_PROXY */
                  {
                          REDEBUG("No tunneled reply was found, and the request was not proxied: rejecting the user");
                          code = FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT;
                  }
                break;
 
        default:
                /*
                 *      Returns RLM_MODULE_FOO, and we want to return FR_FOO
                 */
                rcode = process_reply(eap_session, tls_session, request, fake->reply, &fake->reply_pairs);
                switch (rcode) {
                case RLM_MODULE_REJECT:
                        code = FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT;
                        break;
 
                case RLM_MODULE_HANDLED:
                        code = FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE;
                        break;
 
                case RLM_MODULE_OK:
                        code = FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT;
                        break;
 
                default:
                        code = FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT;
                        break;
                }
                break;
        }
 
        talloc_free(fake);
 
        return code;
}
 
static fr_radius_packet_code_t eap_fast_crypto_binding(request_t *request, UNUSED eap_session_t *eap_session,
                                       fr_tls_session_t *tls_session, eap_tlv_crypto_binding_tlv_t *binding)
{
        uint8_t                 cmac[sizeof(binding->compound_mac)];
        eap_fast_tunnel_t       *t = talloc_get_type_abort(tls_session->opaque, eap_fast_tunnel_t);
 
        memcpy(cmac, binding->compound_mac, sizeof(cmac));
        memset(binding->compound_mac, 0, sizeof(binding->compound_mac));
 
        RHEXDUMP3((uint8_t const *) binding, sizeof(*binding), "Crypto-Binding TLV for Compound MAC calculation");
        RHEXDUMP3(cmac, sizeof(cmac), "Received Compound MAC");
 
        fr_hmac_sha1(binding->compound_mac, (uint8_t *)binding, sizeof(*binding), t->cmk, EAP_FAST_CMK_LEN);
        if (memcmp(binding->compound_mac, cmac, sizeof(cmac))) {
                RDEBUG2("Crypto-Binding TLV mismatch");
                RHEXDUMP3((uint8_t const *) binding->compound_mac,
                sizeof(binding->compound_mac), "Calculated Compound MAC");
                return FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT;
        }
 
        return FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT;
}
 
static fr_radius_packet_code_t eap_fast_process_tlvs(request_t *request, eap_session_t *eap_session,
                                     fr_tls_session_t *tls_session, fr_pair_list_t *fast_vps)
{
        eap_fast_tunnel_t               *t = talloc_get_type_abort(tls_session->opaque, eap_fast_tunnel_t);
        fr_pair_t                       *vp;
        eap_tlv_crypto_binding_tlv_t    my_binding, *binding = NULL;
 
        memset(&my_binding, 0, sizeof(my_binding));
 
        for (vp = fr_pair_list_head(fast_vps);
             vp;
             vp = fr_pair_list_next(fast_vps, vp)) {
                fr_radius_packet_code_t code = FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT;
                if (vp->da->parent == fr_dict_root(dict_eap_fast)) {
                        if (vp->da == attr_eap_fast_eap_payload) {
                                code = eap_fast_eap_payload(request, eap_session, tls_session, vp);
                                if (code == FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT) t->stage = EAP_FAST_CRYPTOBIND_CHECK;
                        } else if ((vp->da == attr_eap_fast_result) ||
                                   (vp->da == attr_eap_fast_intermediate_result)) {
                                code = FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT;
                                t->stage = EAP_FAST_PROVISIONING;
                        } else {
                                RDEBUG2("ignoring unknown %pP", vp);
                                continue;
                        }
                } else if (vp->da->parent == attr_eap_fast_crypto_binding) {
                        binding = &my_binding;
 
                        /*
                         *      fr_radius_encode_pair() does not work for structures
                         */
                        switch (vp->da->attr) {
                        case 1: /* FR_EAP_FAST_CRYPTO_BINDING_RESERVED */
                                binding->reserved = vp->vp_uint8;
                                break;
                        case 2: /* FR_EAP_FAST_CRYPTO_BINDING_VERSION */
                                binding->version = vp->vp_uint8;
                                break;
                        case 3: /* FR_EAP_FAST_CRYPTO_BINDING_RECV_VERSION */
                                binding->received_version = vp->vp_uint8;
                                break;
                        case 4: /* FR_EAP_FAST_CRYPTO_BINDING_SUB_TYPE */
                                binding->subtype = vp->vp_uint8;
                                break;
                        case 5: /* FR_EAP_FAST_CRYPTO_BINDING_NONCE */
                                if (vp->vp_length >= sizeof(binding->nonce)) {
                                        memcpy(binding->nonce, vp->vp_octets, vp->vp_length);
                                }
                                break;
                        case 6: /* FR_EAP_FAST_CRYPTO_BINDING_COMPOUND_MAC */
                                if (vp->vp_length >= sizeof(binding->compound_mac)) {
                                        memcpy(binding->compound_mac, vp->vp_octets, sizeof(binding->compound_mac));
                                }
                                break;
                        }
                        continue;
                } else if (vp->da->parent == attr_eap_fast_pac_tlv) {
                        if (vp->da == attr_eap_fast_pac_acknowledge) {
                                if (vp->vp_uint32 == EAP_FAST_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS) {
                                        code = FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT;
                                        t->pac.expires = fr_time_max();
                                        t->pac.expired = false;
                                        t->stage = EAP_FAST_COMPLETE;
                                }
                        } else if (vp->da == attr_eap_fast_pac_info_pac_type) {
                                if (vp->vp_uint32 != PAC_TYPE_TUNNEL) {
                                        RDEBUG2("only able to serve Tunnel PAC's, ignoring request");
                                        continue;
                                }
                                t->pac.send = true;
                                continue;
                        } else {
                                RDEBUG2("ignoring unknown EAP-FAST-PAC-TLV %pP", vp);
                                continue;
                        }
                } else {
                        RDEBUG2("ignoring non-EAP-FAST TLV %pP", vp);
                        continue;
                }
 
                if (code == FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT) return FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT;
        }
 
        if (binding) {
                fr_radius_packet_code_t code = eap_fast_crypto_binding(request, eap_session, tls_session, binding);
                if (code == FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT) {
                        t->stage = EAP_FAST_PROVISIONING;
                }
                return code;
        }
 
        return FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT;
}
 
 
/*
 * Process the inner tunnel data
 */
fr_radius_packet_code_t eap_fast_process(request_t *request, eap_session_t *eap_session, fr_tls_session_t *tls_session)
{
        fr_radius_packet_code_t                 code;
        fr_pair_list_t          fast_vps;
        uint8_t const           *data;
        size_t                  data_len;
        eap_fast_tunnel_t       *t;
 
        fr_pair_list_init(&fast_vps);
        /*
         * Just look at the buffer directly, without doing
         * record_to_buff.
         */
        data_len = tls_session->clean_out.used;
        tls_session->clean_out.used = 0;
        data = tls_session->clean_out.data;
 
        t = talloc_get_type_abort(tls_session->opaque, eap_fast_tunnel_t);
 
        /*
         * See if the tunneled data is well formed.
         */
        if (!eap_fast_verify(request, tls_session, data, data_len)) return FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT;
 
        if (t->stage == EAP_FAST_TLS_SESSION_HANDSHAKE) {
                char buf[256];
 
                fr_assert(t->mode == EAP_FAST_UNKNOWN);
 
                if (strstr(SSL_CIPHER_description(SSL_get_current_cipher(tls_session->ssl),
                                                  buf, sizeof(buf)), "Au=None")) {
                        /* FIXME enforce MSCHAPv2 - RFC 5422 section 3.2.2 */
                        RDEBUG2("Using anonymous provisioning");
                        t->mode = EAP_FAST_PROVISIONING_ANON;
                        t->pac.send = true;
                } else {
                        fr_time_t renew;
 
                        if (SSL_session_reused(tls_session->ssl)) {
                                RDEBUG2("Session Resumed from PAC");
                                t->mode = EAP_FAST_NORMAL_AUTH;
                        } else {
                                RDEBUG2("Using authenticated provisioning");
                                t->mode = EAP_FAST_PROVISIONING_AUTH;
                        }
 
                        /*
                         *      Send a new pac at 60% of the lifetime,
                         *      or if the PAC has expired, or if no lifetime was set.
                         */
                        renew = fr_time_add(request->packet->timestamp,
                                            fr_time_delta_wrap((fr_time_delta_unwrap(t->pac_lifetime) * 3) / 5));
 
                        if (t->pac.expired || fr_time_eq(t->pac.expires, fr_time_wrap(0)) ||
                             fr_time_lteq(t->pac.expires, renew)) {
                                t->pac.send = true;
                        }
                }
 
                eap_fast_init_keys(request, tls_session);
 
                eap_fast_send_identity_request(request, tls_session, eap_session);
 
                t->stage = EAP_FAST_AUTHENTICATION;
                return FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE;
        }
 
        if (eap_fast_decode_pair(request, &fast_vps, fr_dict_root(dict_eap_fast),
                                 data, data_len, NULL) < 0) return FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT;
 
        RDEBUG2("Got Tunneled FAST TLVs");
        log_request_pair_list(L_DBG_LVL_1, request, NULL, &fast_vps, NULL);
        code = eap_fast_process_tlvs(request, eap_session, tls_session, &fast_vps);
        fr_pair_list_free(&fast_vps);
 
        if (code == FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT) return FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT;
 
        switch (t->stage) {
        case EAP_FAST_AUTHENTICATION:
                code = FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE;
                break;
 
        case EAP_FAST_CRYPTOBIND_CHECK:
        {
                if (t->mode != EAP_FAST_PROVISIONING_ANON && !t->pac.send)
                        t->result_final = true;
 
                eap_fast_append_result(tls_session, code);
 
                eap_fast_update_icmk(request, tls_session, (uint8_t *)&t->isk);
                eap_fast_append_crypto_binding(request, tls_session);
 
                code = FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE;
                break;
        }
        case EAP_FAST_PROVISIONING:
                t->result_final = true;
 
                eap_fast_append_result(tls_session, code);
 
                if (t->pac.send) {
                        RDEBUG2("Peer requires new PAC");
                        eap_fast_send_pac_tunnel(request, tls_session);
                        code = FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE;
                        break;
                }
 
                t->stage = EAP_FAST_COMPLETE;
                FALL_THROUGH;
 
        case EAP_FAST_COMPLETE:
                /*
                 * RFC 5422 section 3.5 - Network Access after EAP-FAST Provisioning
                 */
                if (t->pac.type && t->pac.expired) {
                        REDEBUG("Rejecting expired PAC.");
                        code = FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT;
                        break;
                }
 
                if (t->mode == EAP_FAST_PROVISIONING_ANON) {
                        REDEBUG("Rejecting unauthenticated provisioning");
                        code = FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT;
                        break;
                }
 
                /*
                 * eap_crypto_mppe_keys() is unsuitable for EAP-FAST as Cisco decided
                 * it would be a great idea to flip the recv/send keys around
                 */
                #define EAPTLS_MPPE_KEY_LEN 32
                eap_add_reply(request, attr_ms_mppe_recv_key, t->msk, EAPTLS_MPPE_KEY_LEN);
                eap_add_reply(request, attr_ms_mppe_send_key, &t->msk[EAPTLS_MPPE_KEY_LEN], EAPTLS_MPPE_KEY_LEN);
                eap_add_reply(request, attr_eap_msk, t->msk, EAP_FAST_KEY_LEN);
                eap_add_reply(request, attr_eap_emsk, t->emsk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
 
                break;
 
        default:
                RERROR("Internal sanity check failed in EAP-FAST at %d", t->stage);
                code = FR_RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT;
        }
 
        return code;
}