session.c

Go to the documentation of this file.

/*
 *   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
 *   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
 *   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
 *   (at your option) any later version.
 *
 *   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
 *   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 *   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
 *   GNU General Public License for more details.
 *
 *   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
 *   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
 *   Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
 */
 
/**
 * $Id: 4951dab20b96f988e540e68bb9f0f40a410307b5 $
 *
 * @file tls/session.c
 * @brief Initialise OpenSSL sessions, and read/write data to/from them.
 *
 * @copyright 2001 hereUare Communications, Inc. (raghud@hereuare.com)
 * @copyright 2003 Alan DeKok (aland@freeradius.org)
 * @copyright 2006-2016 The FreeRADIUS server project
 */
#ifdef WITH_TLS
#define LOG_PREFIX "tls"
 
#include <freeradius-devel/server/pair.h>
#include <freeradius-devel/server/log.h>
 
#include <freeradius-devel/util/debug.h>
#include <freeradius-devel/util/base16.h>
#include <freeradius-devel/util/skip.h>
#include <freeradius-devel/util/pair_legacy.h>
 
#include <freeradius-devel/protocol/freeradius/freeradius.internal.h>
 
#include <freeradius-devel/unlang/call.h>
#include <freeradius-devel/unlang/subrequest.h>
#include <freeradius-devel/unlang/interpret.h>
 
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
 
#include "attrs.h"
#include "base.h"
#include "log.h"
 
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
 
static char const *tls_version_str[] = {
        [SSL2_VERSION]                          = "SSL 2.0",
        [SSL3_VERSION]                          = "SSL 3.0",
        [TLS1_VERSION]                          = "TLS 1.0",
#ifdef TLS1_1_VERSION
        [TLS1_1_VERSION]                        = "TLS 1.1",
#endif
#ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION
        [TLS1_2_VERSION]                        = "TLS 1.2",
#endif
#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
        [TLS1_3_VERSION]                        = "TLS 1.3",
#endif
#ifdef TLS1_4_VERSION
        [TLS1_4_VERSION]                        = "TLS 1.4",
#endif
};
 
static char const *tls_content_type_str[] = {
        [SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC]            = "change_cipher_spec",
        [SSL3_RT_ALERT]                         = "alert",
        [SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE]                     = "handshake",
        [SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA]              = "application_data",
#ifdef SSL3_RT_HEADER
        [SSL3_RT_HEADER]                        = "header",
#endif
#ifdef SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE
        [SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE]            = "inner_content_type",
#endif
};
 
static char const *tls_alert_description_str[] = {
        [SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY]                  = "close_notify",
        [SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE]            = "unexpected_message",
        [SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC]                = "bad_record_mac",
        [TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED]             = "decryption_failed",
        [TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW]               = "record_overflow",
        [SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE]         = "decompression_failure",
        [SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE]             = "handshake_failure",
        [SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE]               = "bad_certificate",
        [SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE]       = "unsupported_certificate",
        [SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED]           = "certificate_revoked",
        [SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED]           = "certificate_expired",
        [SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN]           = "certificate_unknown",
        [SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER]             = "illegal_parameter",
        [TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA]                    = "unknown_ca",
        [TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED]                 = "access_denied",
        [TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR]                  = "decode_error",
        [TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR]                 = "decrypt_error",
        [TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION]            = "export_restriction",
        [TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION]              = "protocol_version",
        [TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY]         = "insufficient_security",
        [TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR]                = "internal_error",
        [TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED]                = "user_cancelled",
        [TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION]              = "no_renegotiation",
#ifdef TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION
        [TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION]            = "missing_extension",
#endif
#ifdef TLS13_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
        [TLS13_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED]         = "certificate_required",
#endif
#ifdef TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
        [TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION]         = "unsupported_extension",
#endif
#ifdef TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE
        [TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE]      = "certificate_unobtainable",
#endif
#ifdef  TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
        [TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME]             = "unrecognised_name",
#endif
#ifdef TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
        [TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE] = "bad_certificate_status_response",
#endif
#ifdef TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE
        [TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE]    = "bad_certificate_hash_value",
#endif
#ifdef TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
        [TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY]          = "unknown_psk_identity",
#endif
#ifdef TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
        [TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL]       = "no_application_protocol",
#endif
};
 
static char const *tls_handshake_type_str[] = {
        [SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST]                 = "hello_request",
        [SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO]                  = "client_hello",
        [SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO]                  = "server_hello",
#ifdef SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
        [SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET]             = "new_session_ticket",
#endif
#ifdef SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
        [SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA]             = "end_of_early_data",
#endif
#ifdef SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
        [SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS]          = "encrypted_extensions",
#endif
        [SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE]                   = "certificate",
        [SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE]           = "server_key_exchange",
        [SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST]           = "certificate_request",
        [SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE]                   = "server_hello_done",
        [SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY]            = "certificate_verify",
        [SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE]           = "client_key_exchange",
        [SSL3_MT_FINISHED]                      = "finished",
#ifdef SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_URL
        [SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_URL]               = "certificate_url",
#endif
#ifdef SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
        [SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS]            = "certificate_status",
#endif
#ifdef SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
        [SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA]             = "supplemental_data",
#endif
#ifdef SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
        [SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE]                    = "key_update",
#endif
#ifdef SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
        [SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO]                    = "next_proto",
#endif
#ifdef SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH
        [SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH]                  = "message_hash",
#endif
#ifdef DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
        [DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST]         = "hello_verify_request",
#endif
#ifdef SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
        [SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC]            = "change_cipher_spec",
#endif
};
 
/** Clear a record buffer
 *
 * @param record buffer to clear.
 */
inline static void record_init(fr_tls_record_t *record)
{
        record->used = 0;
}
 
/** Destroy a record buffer
 *
 * @param record buffer to destroy clear.
 */
inline static void record_close(fr_tls_record_t *record)
{
        record->used = 0;
}
 
/** Copy data to the intermediate buffer, before we send it somewhere
 *
 * @param[in] record    buffer to write to.
 * @param[in] in        data to write.
 * @param[in] inlen     Length of data to write.
 * @return the amount of data written to the record buffer.
 */
inline static unsigned int record_from_buff(fr_tls_record_t *record, void const *in, unsigned int inlen)
{
        unsigned int added = FR_TLS_MAX_RECORD_SIZE - record->used;
 
        if (added > inlen) added = inlen;
        if (added == 0) return 0;
 
        memcpy(record->data + record->used, in, added);
        record->used += added;
 
        return added;
}
 
/** Take data from the buffer, and give it to the caller
 *
 * @param[in] record    buffer to read from.
 * @param[out] out      where to write data from record buffer.
 * @param[in] outlen    The length of the output buffer.
 * @return the amount of data written to the output buffer.
 */
inline static unsigned int record_to_buff(fr_tls_record_t *record, void *out, unsigned int outlen)
{
        unsigned int taken = record->used;
 
        if (taken > outlen) taken = outlen;
        if (taken == 0) return 0;
        if (out) memcpy(out, record->data, taken);
 
        record->used -= taken;
 
        /*
         *      This is pretty bad...
         */
        if (record->used > 0) memmove(record->data, record->data + taken, record->used);
 
        return taken;
}
 
/** Return the static private key password we have configured
 *
 * @param[out] buf      Where to write the password to.
 * @param[in] size      The length of buf.
 * @param[in] rwflag
 *                      - 0 if password used for decryption.
 *                      - 1 if password used for encryption.
 * @param[in] u The static password.
 * @return
 *      - 0 on error.
 *      - >0 on success (the length of the password).
 */
int fr_tls_session_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag UNUSED, void *u)
{
        size_t len;
 
        /*
         *      We do this instead of not registering the callback
         *      to ensure OpenSSL doesn't try and read a password
         *      from stdin (causes server to block).
         */
        if (!u) {
                ERROR("Private key encrypted but no private_key_password configured");
                return 0;
        }
 
        len = strlcpy(buf, (char *)u, size);
        if (len > (size_t)size) {
                ERROR("Password too long.  Maximum length is %i bytes", size - 1);
                return 0;
        }
 
        return len;
}
 
#ifdef PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
/** Verify the PSK identity contains no reserved chars
 *
 * @param identity to check.
 * @return
 *      - true identity does not contain reserved chars.
 *      - false identity contains reserved chars.
 */
static bool session_psk_identity_is_safe(const char *identity)
{
        char c;
 
        if (!identity) return true;
 
        while ((c = *(identity++)) != '\0') {
                if (isalpha((uint8_t) c) || isdigit((uint8_t) c) || isspace((uint8_t) c) ||
                    (c == '@') || (c == '-') || (c == '_') || (c == '.')) {
                        continue;
                }
 
                return false;
        }
 
        return true;
}
 
/** Determine the PSK to use for an outgoing connection
 *
 * @param[in] ssl               session.
 * @param[in] identity          The identity of the PSK to search for.
 * @param[out] psk              Where to write the PSK we found (if any).
 * @param[in] max_psk_len       The length of the buffer provided for PSK.
 * @return
 *      - 0 if no PSK matching identity was found.
 *      - >0 if a PSK matching identity was found (the length of bytes written to psk).
 */
unsigned int fr_tls_session_psk_client_cb(SSL *ssl, UNUSED char const *hint,
                                          char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len,
                                          unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)
{
        unsigned int psk_len;
        fr_tls_conf_t *conf;
 
        conf = (fr_tls_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF);
        if (!conf) return 0;
 
        psk_len = strlen(conf->psk_password);
        if (psk_len > (2 * max_psk_len)) return 0;
 
        strlcpy(identity, conf->psk_identity, max_identity_len);
 
        return fr_base16_decode(NULL,
                          &FR_DBUFF_TMP((uint8_t *)psk, (size_t)max_psk_len),
                          &FR_SBUFF_IN(conf->psk_password, (size_t)psk_len), false);
}
 
/** Determine the PSK to use for an incoming connection
 *
 * @param[in] ssl               session.
 * @param[in] identity          The identity of the PSK to search for.
 * @param[out] psk              Where to write the PSK we found (if any).
 * @param[in] max_psk_len       The length of the buffer provided for PSK.
 * @return
 *      - 0 if no PSK matching identity was found.
 *      - >0 if a PSK matching identity was found (the length of bytes written to psk).
 */
unsigned int fr_tls_session_psk_server_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
                                          unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)
{
        size_t          psk_len = 0;
        fr_tls_conf_t   *conf;
        request_t       *request;
 
        conf = (fr_tls_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF);
        if (!conf) return 0;
 
        request = fr_tls_session_request(ssl);
        if (request && conf->psk_query) {
                size_t hex_len;
                fr_pair_t *vp;
                char buffer[2 * PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN + 4]; /* allow for too-long keys */
 
                /*
                 *      The passed identity is weird.  Deny it.
                 */
                if (!session_psk_identity_is_safe(identity)) {
                        RWDEBUG("Invalid characters in PSK identity %s", identity);
                        return 0;
                }
 
                MEM(pair_update_request(&vp, attr_tls_psk_identity) >= 0);
                if (fr_pair_value_from_str(vp, identity, strlen(identity), NULL, true) < 0) {
                        RPWDEBUG2("Failed parsing TLS PSK Identity");
                        talloc_free(vp);
                        return 0;
                }
 
                hex_len = xlat_eval(buffer, sizeof(buffer), request, conf->psk_query, NULL, NULL);
                if (!hex_len) {
                        RWDEBUG("PSK expansion returned an empty string.");
                        return 0;
                }
 
                /*
                 *      The returned key is truncated at MORE than
                 *      OpenSSL can handle.  That way we can detect
                 *      the truncation, and complain about it.
                 */
                if (hex_len > (2 * max_psk_len)) {
                        RWDEBUG("Returned PSK is too long (%u > %u)", (unsigned int) hex_len, 2 * max_psk_len);
                        return 0;
                }
 
                /*
                 *      Leave the TLS-PSK-Identity in the request, and
                 *      convert the expansion from printable string
                 *      back to hex.
                 */
                return fr_base16_decode(NULL,
                                  &FR_DBUFF_TMP((uint8_t *)psk, (size_t)max_psk_len),
                                  &FR_SBUFF_IN(buffer, hex_len), false);
        }
 
        if (!conf->psk_identity) {
                DEBUG("No static PSK identity set.  Rejecting the user");
                return 0;
        }
 
        /*
         *      No request_t, or no dynamic query.  Just look for a
         *      static identity.
         */
        if (strcmp(identity, conf->psk_identity) != 0) {
                ERROR("Supplied PSK identity %s does not match configuration.  Rejecting.",
                      identity);
                return 0;
        }
 
        psk_len = strlen(conf->psk_password);
        if (psk_len > (2 * max_psk_len)) return 0;
 
        return fr_base16_decode(NULL,
                          &FR_DBUFF_TMP((uint8_t *)psk, (size_t)max_psk_len),
                          &FR_SBUFF_IN(conf->psk_password, psk_len), false);
}
#endif /* PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN */
 
DIAG_OFF(DIAG_UNKNOWN_PRAGMAS)
DIAG_OFF(used-but-marked-unused)        /* Fix spurious warnings for sk_ macros */
/** Record session state changes
 *
 * Called by OpenSSL whenever the session state changes, an alert is received or an error occurs.
 *
 * @param[in] ssl       session.
 * @param[in] where     Which context the callback is being called in.
 *                      See https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.html
 *                      for additional info.
 * @param[in] ret       0 if an error occurred, or the alert type if an alert was received.
 */
void fr_tls_session_info_cb(SSL const *ssl, int where, int ret)
{
        char const      *role, *state;
        request_t       *request = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST);
 
        if ((where & ~SSL_ST_MASK) & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
                role = "Client ";
        } else if (((where & ~SSL_ST_MASK)) & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) {
                role = "Server ";
        } else {
                role = "";
        }
 
        state = SSL_state_string_long(ssl);
        state = state ? state : "<INVALID>";
 
        if ((where & SSL_CB_LOOP) || (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) || (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) {
                if (ROPTIONAL_ENABLED(RDEBUG_ENABLED3, DEBUG_ENABLED3)) {
                        char const *abbrv = SSL_state_string(ssl);
                        size_t len;
 
                        /*
                         *      Trim crappy OpenSSL state strings...
                         */
                        len = strlen(abbrv);
                        if ((len > 1) && (abbrv[len - 1] == ' ')) len--;
 
                        ROPTIONAL(RDEBUG3, DEBUG3, "Handshake state [%.*s] - %s%s", (int)len, abbrv, role, state);
 
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
                        {
                                STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *server_ciphers;
                                STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *client_ciphers;
 
                                /*
                                 *      After a ClientHello, list all the proposed ciphers
                                 *      from the client.
                                 *
                                 *      Only do this if we don't have SSL_trace() as
                                 *      SSL_trace() prints this information and we don't
                                 *      want to duplicate it.
                                 */
                                if (SSL_get_state(ssl) == TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO &&
                                    (client_ciphers = SSL_get_client_ciphers(ssl))) {
                                        int i;
                                        int num_ciphers;
                                        const SSL_CIPHER *this_cipher;
 
                                        server_ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
                                        /*
                                         *      These are printed on startup, so not usually
                                         *      required.
                                         */
                                        ROPTIONAL(RDEBUG4, DEBUG4, "Our preferred ciphers (by priority)");
                                        if (ROPTIONAL_ENABLED(RDEBUG_ENABLED4, DEBUG_ENABLED4)) {
                                                if (request) RINDENT();
                                                num_ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(server_ciphers);
                                                for (i = 0; i < num_ciphers; i++) {
                                                        this_cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(server_ciphers, i);
                                                        ROPTIONAL(RDEBUG4, DEBUG4, "[%i] %s", i, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(this_cipher));
                                                }
                                                if (request) REXDENT();
                                        }
 
                                        /*
                                         *      Print information about the client's
                                         *      handshake message.
                                         */
                                        if (ROPTIONAL_ENABLED(RDEBUG_ENABLED3, DEBUG_ENABLED3)) {
                                                ROPTIONAL(RDEBUG3, DEBUG3, "Client's preferred ciphers (by priority)");
                                                if (request) RINDENT();
                                                num_ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(client_ciphers);
                                                for (i = 0; i < num_ciphers; i++) {
                                                        this_cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(client_ciphers, i);
                                                        ROPTIONAL(RDEBUG3, DEBUG3, "[%i] %s", i, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(this_cipher));
                                                }
                                                if (request) REXDENT();
                                        }
                                }
                        }
#  endif
                } else {
                        ROPTIONAL(RDEBUG2, DEBUG2, "Handshake state - %s%s (%u)", role, state, SSL_get_state(ssl));
                }
                return;
        }
 
        if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
                if ((ret & 0xff) == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) return;
 
                /*
                 *      We got an alert...
                 */
                if (where & SSL_CB_READ) {
                        fr_pair_t *vp;
 
                        ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "Client sent %s TLS alert (%i) - %s", SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret),
                                  ret & 0xff, SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret));
 
                        /*
                         *      Offer helpful advice... Should be expanded.
                         */
                        switch (ret & 0xff) {
                        case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
                                REDEBUG("Verify the client has a copy of the server's Certificate "
                                        "Authority (CA) installed, and trusts that CA");
                                break;
 
                        default:
                                break;
                        }
 
                        if (request) {
                                MEM(pair_update_request(&vp, attr_tls_client_error_code) >= 0);
                                vp->vp_uint8 = ret & 0xff;
                                RDEBUG2("TLS-Client-Error-Code := %pV", &vp->data);
                        }
                /*
                 *      We're sending the client an alert.
                 */
                } else {
                        ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "Sending client %s TLS alert (%i) - %s",
                                  SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret), ret & 0xff, SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret));
 
                        /*
                         *      Offer helpful advice... Should be expanded.
                         */
                        switch (ret & 0xff) {
                        case TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
                                ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "Client requested a TLS protocol version that is not "
                                          "enabled or not supported. Upgrade FreeRADIUS + OpenSSL to their latest "
                                          "versions and/or adjust 'tls_max_version'/'tls_min_version' if you want "
                                          "authentication to succeed");
                                break;
 
                        default:
                                break;
                        }
                }
                return;
        }
 
        if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
                if (ret == 0) {
                        ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "Handshake exit state %s%s", role, state);
                        return;
                }
 
                if (ret < 0) {
                        if (SSL_want_read(ssl)) {
                                RDEBUG2("Need more data from client"); /* State same as previous call, don't print */
                                return;
                        }
                        ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "Handshake exit state %s%s", role, state);
                }
        }
}
DIAG_ON(used-but-marked-unused)
DIAG_ON(DIAG_UNKNOWN_PRAGMAS)
 
/** Print a message to the request or global log detailing handshake state
 *
 * @param[in] request   The current #request_t.
 * @param[in] tls_session       The current TLS session.
 */
static void session_msg_log(request_t *request, fr_tls_session_t *tls_session, uint8_t const *data, size_t data_len)
{
        char const      *version, *content_type;
        char const      *str_details1 = NULL;
        char const      *str_details2 = NULL;
        char            unknown_version[32];
        char            unknown_content_type[32];
        char            unknown_alert_level[32];
        char            unknown_alert_description[32];
        char            unknown_handshake_type[32];
 
        /*
         *      Don't print this out in the normal course of
         *      operations.
         */
        if (!ROPTIONAL_ENABLED(RDEBUG_ENABLED2, DEBUG_ENABLED2)) return;
 
        if (((size_t)tls_session->info.version >= NUM_ELEMENTS(tls_version_str)) ||
            !tls_version_str[tls_session->info.version]) {
                snprintf(unknown_version, sizeof(unknown_version), "unknown_tls_version_0x%04x",
                         (unsigned int) tls_session->info.version);
                version = unknown_version;
        } else {
                version = tls_version_str[tls_session->info.version];
        }
 
        /*
         *      TLS 1.0, 1.1, 1.2 content types are the same as SSLv3
         */
        if (((size_t)tls_session->info.content_type >= NUM_ELEMENTS(tls_content_type_str)) ||
            !tls_content_type_str[tls_session->info.content_type]) {
                snprintf(unknown_content_type, sizeof(unknown_content_type),
                         "unknown_content_type_0x%04x", (unsigned int) tls_session->info.content_type);
                content_type = unknown_content_type;
        } else {
                content_type = tls_content_type_str[tls_session->info.content_type];
        }
 
        if (tls_session->info.content_type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
                if (tls_session->info.record_len == 2) {
                        switch (tls_session->info.alert_level) {
                        case SSL3_AL_WARNING:
                                str_details1 = "warning";
                                break;
                        case SSL3_AL_FATAL:
                                str_details1 = "fatal";
                                break;
 
                        default:
                                snprintf(unknown_alert_level, sizeof(unknown_alert_level),
                                         "unknown_alert_level_0x%04x", tls_session->info.alert_level);
                                str_details1 = unknown_alert_level;
                                break;
                        }
 
                        if (((size_t)tls_session->info.alert_description >= NUM_ELEMENTS(tls_alert_description_str)) ||
                            !tls_alert_description_str[tls_session->info.alert_description]) {
                                snprintf(unknown_alert_description, sizeof(unknown_alert_description),
                                         "unknown_alert_0x%04x", tls_session->info.alert_description);
                                str_details2 = unknown_alert_description;
                        } else {
                                str_details2 = tls_alert_description_str[tls_session->info.alert_description];
                        }
                } else {
                        str_details1 = "unknown_alert_level";
                        str_details2 = "unknown_alert";
                }
        }
 
        if ((size_t)tls_session->info.content_type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
                if (tls_session->info.record_len > 0) {
                        /*
                         *      Range guard not needed due to size of array
                         *      and underlying type.
                         */
                        if (!tls_handshake_type_str[tls_session->info.handshake_type]) {
                                snprintf(unknown_handshake_type, sizeof(unknown_handshake_type),
                                         "unknown_handshake_type_0x%02x", tls_session->info.handshake_type);
                                str_details1 = unknown_handshake_type;
                        } else {
                                str_details1 = tls_handshake_type_str[tls_session->info.handshake_type];
                        }
                }
        }
 
        snprintf(tls_session->info.info_description, sizeof(tls_session->info.info_description),
                 "%s %s, %s[length %lu]%s%s%s%s",
                 tls_session->info.origin ? ">>> send" : "<<< recv",
                 version,
                 content_type,
                 (unsigned long)tls_session->info.record_len,
                 str_details1 ? ", " : "",
                 str_details1 ? str_details1 : "",
                 str_details2 ? ", " : "",
                 str_details2 ? str_details2 : "");
 
        /*
         *      Print out information about the record and print the
         *      data at higher debug levels.
         */
        if (ROPTIONAL_ENABLED(RDEBUG_ENABLED4, DEBUG_ENABLED4)) {
                ROPTIONAL(RHEXDUMP4, HEXDUMP4, data, data_len, "%s", tls_session->info.info_description);
        } else {
                ROPTIONAL(RDEBUG2, DEBUG2, "%s", tls_session->info.info_description);
        }
}
 
/** Record the progression of the TLS handshake
 *
 * This callback is called by OpenSSL whenever a protocol message relating to a handshake is sent
 * or received.
 *
 * This function copies state information from the various arguments into the state->info
 * structure of the #fr_tls_session_t, to allow us to track the progression of the handshake.
 *
 * @param[in] write_p
 *                              - 0 when a message has been received.
 *                              - 1 when a message has been sent.
 *
 * @param[in] msg_version       The TLS version negotiated, should be one of:
 *                              - TLS1_VERSION
 *                              - TLS1_1_VERSION
 *                              - TLS1_2_VERSION
 *                              - TLS1_3_VERSION
 *
 * @param[in] content_type      One of the contentType values defined for TLS:
 *                              - SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC (20)
 *                              - SSL3_RT_ALERT (21)
 *                              - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (22)
 *                              - TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT (24)
 *
 * @param[in] inbuf             The raw protocol message.
 * @param[in] len               Length of the raw protocol message.
 * @param[in] ssl               The SSL session.
 * @param[in] arg               The #fr_tls_session_t holding the SSL session.
 */
void fr_tls_session_msg_cb(int write_p, int msg_version, int content_type,
                           void const *inbuf, size_t len,
                           SSL *ssl, void *arg)
{
        uint8_t const           *buf = inbuf;
        fr_tls_session_t        *tls_session = talloc_get_type_abort(arg, fr_tls_session_t);
        request_t               *request = fr_tls_session_request(tls_session->ssl);
 
        /*
         *      Mostly to check for memory corruption...
         */
        if (!fr_cond_assert(tls_session->ssl == ssl)) {
                ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "fr_tls_session_t and ssl arg do not match in fr_tls_session_msg_cb");
                tls_session->invalid = true;
                return;
        }
 
        /*
         *      As per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7568
         *
         *      We explicitly disable SSLv2/v3, hence the asserts.
         */
#ifdef SSL2_VERSION
        if (!fr_cond_assert(msg_version != SSL2_VERSION)) {
                ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "Invalid version (SSLv2) in handshake");
                tls_session->invalid = true;
                return;
        }
#endif
 
#ifdef SSL3_VERSION
        if (!fr_cond_assert(msg_version != SSL3_VERSION)) {
                ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "Invalid version (SSLv3) in handshake");
                tls_session->invalid = true;
                return;
        }
#endif
 
        /*
         *      OpenSSL >= 1.0.2 calls this function with 'pseudo'
         *      content types.  Which breaks our tracking of
         *      the SSL Session state.
         */
        if ((msg_version == 0) && (content_type > UINT8_MAX)) {
                ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG4, DEBUG4, "Ignoring fr_tls_session_msg_cb call with pseudo content type %i, version %i",
                          content_type, msg_version);
                return;
        }
 
        if ((write_p != 0) && (write_p != 1)) {
                ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG4, DEBUG4, "Ignoring fr_tls_session_msg_cb call with invalid write_p %d", write_p);
                return;
        }
 
        /*
         *      0 - received (from peer)
         *      1 - sending (to peer)
         */
        tls_session->info.origin = write_p;
        tls_session->info.content_type = content_type;
        tls_session->info.record_len = len;
        tls_session->info.version = msg_version;
        tls_session->info.initialized = true;
 
        switch (content_type) {
        case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
                if (len < 2) {
                        ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "Invalid TLS Alert.  Closing connection");
                        tls_session->invalid = true;
                        return;
                }
 
                tls_session->info.alert_level = buf[0];
                tls_session->info.alert_description = buf[1];
                tls_session->info.handshake_type = 0x00;
                break;
 
        case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
                tls_session->info.handshake_type = buf[0];
                tls_session->info.alert_level = 0x00;
                tls_session->info.alert_description = 0x00;
                break;
 
#ifdef SSL3_RT_HEARTBEAT
        case TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT:
                uint8_t *p = buf;
 
                if ((len >= 3) && (p[0] == 1)) {
                        size_t payload_len;
 
                        payload_len = fr_nbo_to_uint16(p + 1);
                        if ((payload_len + 3) > len) {
                                tls_session->invalid = true;
                                ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "OpenSSL Heartbeat attack detected.  Closing connection");
                                return;
                        }
                }
                break;
#endif
        default:
                break;
        }
 
        session_msg_log(request, tls_session, (uint8_t const *)inbuf, len);
 
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
        if (ROPTIONAL_ENABLED(RDEBUG_ENABLED3, DEBUG_ENABLED3)) {
                SSL_trace(tls_session->info.origin,
                          tls_session->info.version,
                          tls_session->info.content_type,
                          inbuf, len,
                          ssl,
                          request ?
                                fr_tls_request_log_bio(request, L_DBG, L_DBG_LVL_3) :
                                fr_tls_global_log_bio(L_DBG, L_DBG_LVL_3));
        }
#endif
}
 
/*
 *  By setting the environment variable SSLKEYLOGFILE to a filename keying
 *  material will be exported that you may use with Wireshark to decode any
 *  TLS flows. Please see the following for more details:
 *
 *      https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/TLS#tls-decryption
 *
 *  An example logging session is (you should delete the file on each run):
 *
 *      rm -f /tmp/sslkey.log; env SSLKEYLOGFILE=/tmp/sslkey.log freeradius -X | tee /tmp/debug
 *
 *  Note that we rely on the OS to check file permissions.  If the
 *  caller can run radiusd, then they can only write to files which
 *  they own.  If radiusd is running as root, then only root can
 *  change the environment variables for radiusd.
 */
void fr_tls_session_keylog_cb(const SSL *ssl, const char *line)
{
        int fd;
        size_t len;
        const char *filename;
        char buffer[64 + 2*SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 2*SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 
        /*
         *      Prefer the environment variable definition to the
         *      configuration file.  This allows for "one-shot"
         *      dumping of EAP keys when you know you're not using
         *      RadSec, and you don't want to edit the configuration.
         */
        filename = getenv("SSLKEYLOGFILE");
        if (!filename) {
                fr_tls_conf_t *conf;
 
                conf = (fr_tls_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF);
                if (!conf || !conf->keylog_file || !*conf->keylog_file) return;
 
                filename = conf->keylog_file;
        }
 
        /*
         *      We write all of the data at once.  This is *generally*
         *      atomic on most systems.
         */
        len = strlen(line);
        if ((len + 1) > sizeof(buffer)) {
                DEBUG("SSLKEYLOGFILE buffer not large enough, max %lu, required %lu", sizeof(buffer), len + 1);
                return;
        }
 
        /*
         *      Add a \n, which means that in order to write() the
         *      buffer AND the trailing \n, we have to place both
         *      strings into the same buffer.
         */
        memcpy(buffer, line, len);
        buffer[len] = '\n';
 
        fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_APPEND, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
        if (fd < 0) {
                DEBUG("Failed to open file %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
                return;
        }
 
        /*
         *      This should work in most situations.
         */
        if (write(fd, buffer, len + 1) < 0) {
                DEBUG("Failed to write to file %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
        }
 
        close(fd);
}
 
/** Decrypt application data
 *
 * @note Handshake must have completed before this function may be called.
 *
 * Feed data from dirty_in to OpenSSL, and read the clean data into clean_out.
 *
 * @param[in] request           The current #request_t.
 * @param[in] tls_session       The current TLS session.
 * @return
 *      - -1 on error.
 *      - 1 if more fragments are required to fully reassemble the record for decryption.
 *      - 0 if we decrypted a complete record.
 */
int fr_tls_session_recv(request_t *request, fr_tls_session_t *tls_session)
{
        int ret;
 
        fr_tls_session_request_bind(tls_session->ssl, request);
 
        if (!SSL_is_init_finished(tls_session->ssl)) {
                REDEBUG("Attempted to read application data before handshake completed");
        error:
                ret = -1;
                goto finish;
        }
 
        /*
         *      Decrypt the complete record.
         */
        if (tls_session->dirty_in.used) {
                ret = BIO_write(tls_session->into_ssl, tls_session->dirty_in.data, tls_session->dirty_in.used);
                if (ret != (int) tls_session->dirty_in.used) {
                        REDEBUG("Failed writing %zu bytes to SSL BIO: %d", tls_session->dirty_in.used, ret);
                        record_init(&tls_session->dirty_in);
                        goto error;
                }
 
                record_init(&tls_session->dirty_in);
        }
 
        /*
         *      Clear the dirty buffer now that we are done with it
         *      and init the clean_out buffer to store decrypted data
         */
        record_init(&tls_session->clean_out);
 
        /*
         *      Prevent spurious errors on the thread local error
         *      stack causing SSL_get_error() to return SSL_ERROR_SSL
         *      instead of what of the SSL_ERROR_WANT_* values.
         */
        ERR_clear_error();
 
        /*
         *      Read (and decrypt) the tunneled data from the
         *      SSL session, and put it into the decrypted
         *      data buffer.
         */
        ret = SSL_read(tls_session->ssl, tls_session->clean_out.data, sizeof(tls_session->clean_out.data));
        if (ret < 0) {
                int code;
 
                code = SSL_get_error(tls_session->ssl, ret);
                switch (code) {
                case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
                        RWDEBUG("Peer indicated record was complete, but OpenSSL returned SSL_WANT_READ. "
                                "Attempting to continue");
                        ret = 1;
                        goto finish;
 
                case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
                        REDEBUG("Error in fragmentation logic: SSL_WANT_WRITE");
                        goto error;
 
                case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
                        RDEBUG2("No application data received.  Assuming handshake is continuing...");
                        ret = 0;
                        break;
 
                default:
                        REDEBUG("Error in fragmentation logic");
                        fr_tls_log_io_error(request, code, "SSL_read (%s)", __FUNCTION__);
                        goto error;
                }
        }
 
        /*
         *      Passed all checks, successfully decrypted data
         */
        tls_session->clean_out.used = ret;
        ret = 0;
 
        if (RDEBUG_ENABLED3) {
                RHEXDUMP3(tls_session->clean_out.data, tls_session->clean_out.used,
                         "Decrypted TLS application data (%zu bytes)", tls_session->clean_out.used);
        } else {
                RDEBUG2("Decrypted TLS application data (%zu bytes)", tls_session->clean_out.used);
        }
finish:
        fr_tls_session_request_unbind(tls_session->ssl);
 
        return ret;
}
 
/** Encrypt application data
 *
 * @note Handshake must have completed before this function may be called.
 *
 * Take cleartext data from clean_in, and feed it to OpenSSL, reading
 * the encrypted data into dirty_out.
 *
 * @param[in] request The current request.
 * @param[in] tls_session The current TLS session.
 * @return
 *      - -1 on failure.
 *      - 0 on success.
 */
int fr_tls_session_send(request_t *request, fr_tls_session_t *tls_session)
{
        int ret = 0;
 
        fr_tls_session_request_bind(tls_session->ssl, request);
 
        if (!SSL_is_init_finished(tls_session->ssl)) {
                REDEBUG("Attempted to write application data before handshake completed");
                ret = -1;
                goto finish;
        }
 
        /*
         *      If there's un-encrypted data in 'clean_in', then write
         *      that data to the SSL session, and then call the BIO function
         *      to get that encrypted data from the SSL session, into
         *      a buffer which we can then package into an EAP packet.
         *
         *      Based on Server's logic this clean_in is expected to
         *      contain the data to send to the client.
         */
        if (tls_session->clean_in.used > 0) {
                /*
                 *      Ensure spurious errors aren't printed
                 */
                ERR_clear_error();
 
                if (RDEBUG_ENABLED3) {
                        RHEXDUMP3(tls_session->clean_in.data, tls_session->clean_in.used,
                                 "TLS application data to encrypt (%zu bytes)", tls_session->clean_in.used);
                } else {
                        RDEBUG2("TLS application data to encrypt (%zu bytes)", tls_session->clean_in.used);
                }
 
                ret = SSL_write(tls_session->ssl, tls_session->clean_in.data, tls_session->clean_in.used);
                if (ret < 0) goto log_io_error;
                record_to_buff(&tls_session->clean_in, NULL, ret);
 
                /* Get the dirty data from Bio to send it */
                ret = BIO_read(tls_session->from_ssl, tls_session->dirty_out.data,
                               sizeof(tls_session->dirty_out.data));
                if (ret < 0) {
                log_io_error:
                        ret = fr_tls_log_io_error(request, SSL_get_error(tls_session->ssl, ret),
                                                  "SSL_write (%s)", __FUNCTION__);
                        /*
                         *      ret<0 means that we have a real error.
                         *
                         *      ret=0 means the "error" is SSL_WANT_READ, SSL_WANT_WRITE, etc.
                         */
                } else {
                        tls_session->dirty_out.used = ret;
                        ret = 0;
                }
        }
 
finish:
        fr_tls_session_request_unbind(tls_session->ssl);
 
        return ret;
}
 
/** Instruct fr_tls_session_async_handshake to create a synthesised TLS alert record and send it to the peer
 *
 */
int fr_tls_session_alert(UNUSED request_t *request, fr_tls_session_t *session, uint8_t level, uint8_t description)
{
        if (session->alerts_sent > 3) return -1;                /* Some kind of state machine brokenness */
 
        /*
         *      Ignore less severe alerts
         */
        if (session->pending_alert && (level < session->pending_alert_level)) return 0;
 
        session->pending_alert = true;
        session->pending_alert_level = level;
        session->pending_alert_description = description;
 
        return 0;
}
 
static void fr_tls_session_alert_send(request_t *request, fr_tls_session_t *session)
{
        /*
         *      Update our internal view of the session
         */
        session->info.origin = TLS_INFO_ORIGIN_RECORD_SENT;
        session->info.content_type = SSL3_RT_ALERT;
        session->info.alert_level = session->pending_alert_level;
        session->info.alert_description = session->pending_alert_description;
 
        session->dirty_out.data[0] = session->info.content_type;
        session->dirty_out.data[1] = 3;
        session->dirty_out.data[2] = 1;
        session->dirty_out.data[3] = 0;
        session->dirty_out.data[4] = 2;
        session->dirty_out.data[5] = session->pending_alert_level;
        session->dirty_out.data[6] = session->pending_alert_description;
 
        session->dirty_out.used = 7;
 
        session->pending_alert = false;
        session->alerts_sent++;
 
        SSL_clear(session->ssl);        /* Reset the SSL *, to allow the client to restart the session */
 
        session_msg_log(request, session, session->dirty_out.data, session->dirty_out.used);
}
 
/** Process the result of `establish session { ... }`
 *
 * As this is just a logging session, it's result doesn't affect the parent.
 */
static unlang_action_t tls_establish_session_result(UNUSED request_t *request, UNUSED void *uctx)
{
        return UNLANG_ACTION_CALCULATE_RESULT;
}
 
/** Push an `establish session { ... }` call into the current request, using a subrequest
 *
 * @param[in] request           The current request.
 * @param[in] conf              TLS configuration.
 * @param[in] tls_session       The current TLS session.
 * @return
 *      - UNLANG_ACTION_PUSHED_CHILD on success.
 *      - UNLANG_ACTION_FAIL on failure.
 */
static inline CC_HINT(always_inline)
unlang_action_t tls_establish_session_push(request_t *request, fr_tls_conf_t *conf, fr_tls_session_t *tls_session)
{
        request_t       *child;
        fr_pair_t       *vp;
        unlang_action_t ua;
        uint8_t const   *session_id;
        unsigned int    len;
 
        MEM(child = unlang_subrequest_alloc(request, dict_tls));
        request = child;
 
        /*
         *      Setup the child request for reporting session
         */
        MEM(pair_prepend_request(&vp, attr_tls_packet_type) >= 0);
        vp->vp_uint32 = enum_tls_packet_type_establish_session->vb_uint32;
 
        session_id = SSL_SESSION_get_id(tls_session->session, &len);
        if (session_id && (len > 0)) {
                MEM(pair_append_request(&vp, attr_tls_session_id) >= 0);
                fr_pair_value_memdup(vp, session_id, len, false);
        }
 
        /*
         *      Allocate a child, and set it up to call
         *      the TLS virtual server.
         */
        ua = fr_tls_call_push(child, tls_establish_session_result, conf, tls_session, false);
        if (ua < 0) {
                talloc_free(child);
                return UNLANG_ACTION_FAIL;
        }
 
        return ua;
}
 
/** Finish off a handshake round, possibly adding attributes to the request
 *
 */
static unlang_action_t tls_session_async_handshake_done_round(request_t *request, void *uctx)
{
        fr_tls_session_t        *tls_session = talloc_get_type_abort(uctx, fr_tls_session_t);
        int                     ret;
 
        RDEBUG3("entered state %s", __FUNCTION__);
 
        /*
         *      This only occurs once per session, where calling
         *      SSL_read updates the state of the SSL session, setting
         *      this flag to true.
         *
         *      Callbacks provide enough info so we don't need to
         *      print debug statements when the handshake is in other
         *      states.
         */
        if (SSL_is_init_finished(tls_session->ssl)) {
                SSL_CIPHER const        *cipher;
                fr_pair_t               *vp;
                char const              *version;
 
                char cipher_desc[256], cipher_desc_clean[256];
                char *p = cipher_desc, *q = cipher_desc_clean;
 
                cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(tls_session->ssl);
                SSL_CIPHER_description(cipher, cipher_desc, sizeof(cipher_desc));
 
                /*
                 *      Cleanup the output from OpenSSL
                 *      Seems to print info in a tabular format.
                 */
                while (*p != '\0') {
                        if (isspace((uint8_t) *p)) {
                                *q++ = *p;
                                fr_skip_whitespace(p);
                                continue;
                        }
                        *q++ = *p++;
                }
                *q = '\0';
 
                RDEBUG2("Cipher suite: %s", cipher_desc_clean);
 
                RDEBUG2("Adding TLS session information to request");
                RINDENT();
                MEM(pair_update_session_state(&vp, attr_tls_session_cipher_suite) >= 0);
                fr_pair_value_strdup(vp,  SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher), false);
                RDEBUG2("session-state.%pP", vp);
 
                if (((size_t)tls_session->info.version >= NUM_ELEMENTS(tls_version_str)) ||
                    !tls_version_str[tls_session->info.version]) {
                        version = "UNKNOWN";
                } else {
                        version = tls_version_str[tls_session->info.version];
                }
 
                MEM(pair_update_session_state(&vp, attr_tls_session_version) >= 0);
                fr_pair_value_strdup(vp, version, false);
                RDEBUG2("session-state.%pP", vp);
                REXDENT();
 
                /*
                 *      Cache the SSL_SESSION pointer.
                 *
                 *      Which contains all the data we need for session resumption.
                 */
                if (!tls_session->session) {
                        tls_session->session = SSL_get_session(tls_session->ssl);
                        if (!tls_session->session) {
                                REDEBUG("Failed getting TLS session");
                        error:
                                tls_session->result = FR_TLS_RESULT_ERROR;
                                fr_tls_session_request_unbind(tls_session->ssl);
                                return UNLANG_ACTION_CALCULATE_RESULT;
                        }
                }
 
                if (RDEBUG_ENABLED3) {
                        if (SSL_SESSION_print(fr_tls_request_log_bio(request, L_DBG, L_DBG_LVL_3),
                                              tls_session->session) != 1) {
                                RDEBUG3("Failed retrieving session data");
                        }
                }
 
                /*
                 *      Session was resumed, add attribute to mark it as such.
                 */
                if (SSL_session_reused(tls_session->ssl)) {
                        /*
                         *      Mark the request as resumed.
                         */
                        MEM(pair_update_request(&vp, attr_session_resumed) >= 0);
                        vp->vp_bool = true;
                }
        }
 
        /*
         *      Get data to pack and send back to the TLS peer.
         */
        ret = BIO_ctrl_pending(tls_session->from_ssl);
        if (ret > 0) {
                ret = BIO_read(tls_session->from_ssl, tls_session->dirty_out.data,
                               sizeof(tls_session->dirty_out.data));
                if (ret > 0) {
                        tls_session->dirty_out.used = ret;
                } else if (BIO_should_retry(tls_session->from_ssl)) {
                        record_init(&tls_session->dirty_in);
                        RDEBUG2("Asking for more data in tunnel");
 
                } else {
                        fr_tls_log(NULL, NULL);
                        record_init(&tls_session->dirty_in);
                        goto error;
                }
        } else {
                /* Its clean application data, do whatever we want */
                record_init(&tls_session->clean_out);
        }
 
        /*
         *      Trash the current data in dirty_out, and synthesize
         *      a TLS error record.
         *
         *      OpensSL annoyingly provides no mechanism for us to
         *      send alerts, and we need to send alerts as part of
         *      RFC 5216, so this is our only option.
         */
        if (tls_session->pending_alert) fr_tls_session_alert_send(request, tls_session);
 
        /* We are done with dirty_in, reinitialize it */
        record_init(&tls_session->dirty_in);
 
        tls_session->result = FR_TLS_RESULT_SUCCESS;
        fr_tls_session_request_unbind(tls_session->ssl);
        if (SSL_is_init_finished(tls_session->ssl)) {
                fr_tls_conf_t   *conf = fr_tls_session_conf(tls_session->ssl);
                if (conf->establish_session) return tls_establish_session_push(request, conf, tls_session);
        }
        return UNLANG_ACTION_CALCULATE_RESULT;
}
 
/** Try very hard to get the SSL * into a consistent state where it's not yielded
 *
 * ...because if it's yielded, we'll probably leak thread contexts and all kinds of memory.
 *
 * @param[in] request   being cancelled.
 * @param[in] action    we're being signalled with.
 * @param[in] uctx      the SSL * to cancel.
 */
static void tls_session_async_handshake_signal(UNUSED request_t *request, UNUSED fr_signal_t action, void *uctx)
{
        fr_tls_session_t        *tls_session = talloc_get_type_abort(uctx, fr_tls_session_t);
        int                     ret;
 
        /*
         *      We might want to set can_pause = false here
         *      but that would trigger asserts in the
         *      cache code.
         */
 
        /*
         *      If SSL_get_error returns SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC
         *      it means we're yielded in the middle of a
         *      callback.
         *
         *      Keep calling SSL_read() in a loop until we
         *      no longer get SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC, then
         *      shut it down so it's in a consistent state.
         *
         *      It'll get freed later when the request is
         *      freed.
         */
        for (ret = tls_session->last_ret;
             SSL_get_error(tls_session->ssl, ret) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC;
             ret = SSL_read(tls_session->ssl, tls_session->clean_out.data + tls_session->clean_out.used,
                            sizeof(tls_session->clean_out.data) - tls_session->clean_out.used));
 
        /*
         *      Unbind the cancelled request from the SSL *
         */
        fr_tls_session_request_unbind(tls_session->ssl);
}
 
/** Call SSL_read() to continue the TLS state machine
 *
 * This function may be called multiple times, once after every asynchronous request.
 *
 * @param[in] request           The current request.
 * @param[in] uctx              #fr_tls_session_t to continue.
 * @return
 *      - UNLANG_ACTION_CALCULATE_RESULT - We're done with this round.
 *      - UNLANG_ACTION_PUSHED_CHILD - Need to perform more asynchronous actions.
 */
static unlang_action_t tls_session_async_handshake_cont(request_t *request, void *uctx)
{
        fr_tls_session_t        *tls_session = talloc_get_type_abort(uctx, fr_tls_session_t);
        int                     err;
 
        RDEBUG3("(re-)entered state %s", __FUNCTION__);
 
        /*
         *      Clear OpenSSL's thread local error stack.
         *
         *      Why do we need to do this here?  Although SSL_get_error
         *      takes an `SSL *`, which would make you _think_ it was
         *      operating on the error stack for that SSL, it will also
         *      return SSL_ERROR_SSL if there are any errors in the stack.
         *
         *      When operating normally SSL_read() can return < 0, to
         *      indicate it wants more data, or that we need to perform
         *      asynchronous processing.
         *
         *      If spurious errors have been left on the thread local
         *      stack they MUST be cleared before we can call SSL_get_error
         *      otherwise stale errors mask the async notifications
         *      and cause random handshake failures.
         */
        ERR_clear_error();
 
        /*
         *      Magic/More magic? Although SSL_read is normally
         *      used to read application data, it will also
         *      continue the TLS handshake.  Removing this call will
         *      cause the handshake to fail.
         *
         *      We don't ever expect to actually *receive* application
         *      data here.
         *
         *      The reason why we call SSL_read instead of SSL_accept,
         *      or SSL_connect, as it allows this function
         *      to be used, irrespective or whether we're acting
         *      as a client or a server.
         *
         *      If acting as a client SSL_set_connect_state must have
         *      been called before this function.
         *
         *      If acting as a server SSL_set_accept_state must have
         *      been called before this function.
         */
        tls_session->can_pause = true;
        tls_session->last_ret = SSL_read(tls_session->ssl, tls_session->clean_out.data + tls_session->clean_out.used,
                                         sizeof(tls_session->clean_out.data) - tls_session->clean_out.used);
        tls_session->can_pause = false;
        if (tls_session->last_ret > 0) {
                tls_session->clean_out.used += tls_session->last_ret;
 
                /*
                 *      Round successful, and we don't need to do any
                 *      further processing.
                 */
                tls_session->result = FR_TLS_RESULT_SUCCESS;
        finish:
                /*
                 *      Was bound by caller
                 */
                fr_tls_session_request_unbind(tls_session->ssl);
                return UNLANG_ACTION_CALCULATE_RESULT;
        }
 
        /*
         *      Bug in OpenSSL 3.0 - Normal handshaking behaviour
         *      results in spurious "BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD"
         *      errors.
         *
         *      SSL_get_error apparently returns SSL_ERROR_SSL if
         *      there are any errors in the stack.  This masks
         *      SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC and causes the handshake to
         *      fail.
         *
         *      Note: We may want some version of this code
         *      included for all OpenSSL versions.
         *
         *      It would call ERR_GET_FATAL() on each of the errors
         *      in the stack to drain non-fatal errors and prevent
         *      the other (more useful) return codes of
         *      SSL_get_error from being masked.  I guess we'll see
         *      if this occurs in other scenarios.
         */
        if (SSL_get_error(tls_session->ssl, tls_session->last_ret) == SSL_ERROR_SSL) {
                unsigned long ssl_err;
 
                /*
                 *      Some weird OpenSSL thing marking ERR_GET_REASON
                 *      as "unused".  Unclear why this is done as it's
                 *      not deprecated.
                 */
DIAG_OFF(DIAG_UNKNOWN_PRAGMAS)
DIAG_OFF(used-but-marked-unused)
                while ((ssl_err = ERR_peek_error()) && (ERR_GET_REASON(ssl_err) == BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD)) {
                        (void) ERR_get_error();
                }
DIAG_ON(used-but-marked-unused)
DIAG_ON(DIAG_UNKNOWN_PRAGMAS)
        }
 
        /*
         *      Deal with asynchronous requests from OpenSSL.
         *      These aren't actually errors, they're the
         *      result of one of our callbacks indicating that
         *      it'd like to perform the operation
         *      asynchronously.
         */
        switch (err = SSL_get_error(tls_session->ssl, tls_session->last_ret)) {
        case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC:      /* Certification validation or cache loads */
        {
                unlang_action_t ua;
 
                RDEBUG3("Performing async action for libssl");
 
                /*
                 *      Call this function again once we're done
                 *      asynchronously satisfying the load request.
                 */
                if (unlikely(unlang_function_repeat_set(request, tls_session_async_handshake_cont) < 0)) {
                error:
                        tls_session->result = FR_TLS_RESULT_ERROR;
                        goto finish;
                }
 
                /*
                 *      First service any pending cache actions
                 */
                ua = fr_tls_cache_pending_push(request, tls_session);
                switch (ua) {
                case UNLANG_ACTION_FAIL:
                        IGNORE(unlang_function_clear(request), int);
                        goto error;
 
                case UNLANG_ACTION_PUSHED_CHILD:
                        return ua;
 
                default:
                        break;
                }
 
                /*
                 *      Next service any pending certificate
                 *      validation actions.
                 */
                ua = fr_tls_verify_cert_pending_push(request, tls_session);
                switch (ua) {
                case UNLANG_ACTION_FAIL:
                        IGNORE(unlang_function_clear(request), int);
                        goto error;
 
                default:
                        return ua;
                }
        }
 
        case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB:
                RERROR("No async jobs available in pool, increase thread.openssl_async_pool_max");
                goto error;
 
        default:
                /*
                 *      Returns 0 if we can continue processing the handshake
                 *      Returns -1 if we encountered a fatal error.
                 */
                if (fr_tls_log_io_error(request,
                                        err, "SSL_read (%s)", __FUNCTION__) < 0) goto error;
                return tls_session_async_handshake_done_round(request, uctx);
        }
}
 
/** Ingest data for another handshake round
 *
 * Advance the TLS handshake by feeding OpenSSL data from dirty_in,
 * and reading data from OpenSSL into dirty_out.
 *
 * Calls #tls_session_async_handshake_read to perform the actual ingestion.
 * #tls_session_async_handshake_read is split out because we may need to call
 * it multiple times, once after every async action.
 *
 * @param[in] request           The current request.
 * @param[in] uctx              #fr_tls_session_t to continue.
 * @return
 *      - UNLANG_ACTION_CALCULATE_RESULT - We're done with this round.
 *      - UNLANG_ACTION_PUSHED_CHILD - Need to perform more asynchronous actions.
 */
static unlang_action_t tls_session_async_handshake(request_t *request, void *uctx)
{
        fr_tls_session_t *tls_session = talloc_get_type_abort(uctx, fr_tls_session_t);
        int ret;
 
        RDEBUG3("entered state %s", __FUNCTION__);
 
        tls_session->result = FR_TLS_RESULT_IN_PROGRESS;
 
        fr_tls_session_request_bind(tls_session->ssl, request);         /* May be unbound in this function or asynchronously */
 
        /*
         *      This is a logic error.  fr_tls_session_async_handshake
         *      must not be called if the handshake is
         *      complete fr_tls_session_recv must be
         *      called instead.
         */
        if (SSL_is_init_finished(tls_session->ssl)) {
                REDEBUG("Attempted to continue TLS handshake, but handshake has completed");
        error:
                tls_session->result = FR_TLS_RESULT_ERROR;
                fr_tls_session_request_unbind(tls_session->ssl);        /* Was bound in this function */
                return UNLANG_ACTION_CALCULATE_RESULT;
        }
 
        if (tls_session->invalid) {
                REDEBUG("Preventing invalid session from continuing");
                goto error;
        }
 
        /*
         *      Feed dirty data into OpenSSL, so that is can either
         *      process it as Application data (decrypting it)
         *      or continue the TLS handshake.
         */
        if (tls_session->dirty_in.used) {
                ret = BIO_write(tls_session->into_ssl, tls_session->dirty_in.data, tls_session->dirty_in.used);
                if (ret != (int)tls_session->dirty_in.used) {
                        REDEBUG("Failed writing %zu bytes to TLS BIO: %d", tls_session->dirty_in.used, ret);
                        record_init(&tls_session->dirty_in);
                        goto error;
                }
                record_init(&tls_session->dirty_in);
        }
 
        return tls_session_async_handshake_cont(request, uctx); /* Must unbind request, possibly asynchronously */
}
 
/** Push a handshake call onto the stack
 *
 * We push the handshake frame (as opposed to having the caller do it),
 * so that we guarantee there's a frame that the handshake function can
 * manipulate to manage its own state.
 *
 * The result of processing this handshake round can be found in
 * tls_session->result.
 *
 * @param[in] request           The current request.
 * @param[in] tls_session       to continue handshaking.
 * @return
 *      - UNLANG_ACTION_PUSHED_CHILD on success.
 *      - UNLANG_ACTION_FAIL on failure.
 */
unlang_action_t fr_tls_session_async_handshake_push(request_t *request, fr_tls_session_t *tls_session)
{
        return unlang_function_push(request,
                                    tls_session_async_handshake,
                                    NULL,
                                    tls_session_async_handshake_signal,
                                    ~FR_SIGNAL_CANCEL,
                                    UNLANG_SUB_FRAME,
                                    tls_session);
}
 
/** Free a TLS session and any associated OpenSSL data
 *
 * @param session to free.
 * @return 0.
 */
static int _fr_tls_session_free(fr_tls_session_t *session)
{
        if (session->ssl) {
                /*
                 *  The OpenSSL docs state:
                 *
                 *      SSL_shutdown() can be modified to only set the
                 *      connection to "shutdown" state but not actually
                 *      send the "close notify" alert messages, see
                 *      SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3). When "quiet shutdown"
                 *      is enabled, SSL_shutdown() will always succeed and
                 *      return 1.
                 *
                 *  This is only partially correct.  This call does mean
                 *  we don't notify the other party, but the SSL_shutdown
                 *  call can still fail if the handshake hasn't begun, leaving
                 *  spurious errors on the thread local error stack.
                 */
                SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(session->ssl, 1);
 
                /*
                 *  Don't leave spurious errors raised by SSL_shutdown on
                 *  the error stack.
                 */
                if (SSL_shutdown(session->ssl) != 1) ERR_clear_error();
 
                SSL_free(session->ssl);
                session->ssl = NULL;
        }
 
        return 0;
}
 
static void session_init(fr_tls_session_t *session)
{
        session->ssl = NULL;
        session->into_ssl = session->from_ssl = NULL;
        record_init(&session->clean_in);
        record_init(&session->clean_out);
        record_init(&session->dirty_in);
        record_init(&session->dirty_out);
 
        memset(&session->info, 0, sizeof(session->info));
 
        session->mtu = 0;
        session->opaque = NULL;
}
 
/** Create a new client TLS session
 *
 * Configures a new client TLS session, configuring options, setting callbacks etc...
 *
 * @param[in] ctx       to alloc session data in. Should usually be NULL unless the lifetime of the
 *                      session is tied to another talloc'd object.
 * @param[in] ssl_ctx   containing the base configuration for this session.
 * @return
 *      - A new session on success.
 *      - NULL on error.
 */
fr_tls_session_t *fr_tls_session_alloc_client(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx)
{
        int                     verify_mode;
        fr_tls_session_t        *tls_session = NULL;
        fr_tls_conf_t           *conf = fr_tls_ctx_conf(ssl_ctx);
 
        MEM(tls_session = talloc_zero(ctx, fr_tls_session_t));
        talloc_set_destructor(tls_session, _fr_tls_session_free);
        fr_pair_list_init(&tls_session->extra_pairs);
 
        tls_session->ssl = SSL_new(ssl_ctx);
        if (!tls_session->ssl) {
                talloc_free(tls_session);
                return NULL;
        }
 
        /*
         *      Add the message callback to identify what type of
         *      message/handshake is passed
         */
        SSL_set_msg_callback(tls_session->ssl, fr_tls_session_msg_cb);
        SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(tls_session->ssl, tls_session);
        SSL_set_info_callback(tls_session->ssl, fr_tls_session_info_cb);
 
        /*
         *      In Client mode we only accept.
         *
         *      This sets up the SSL session to work correctly with
         *      fr_tls_session_handshake.
         */
        SSL_set_connect_state(tls_session->ssl);
 
        /*
         *      Always verify the peer certificate.
         */
        DEBUG2("Requiring Server certificate");
        verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
        verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
 
        /*
         *      Callback should be fr_tls_verify_cert_cb but this
         *      requires support around SSL_connect for dealing
         *      with async.
         *
         *      If the callback is NULL OpenSSL uses its own validation
         *      function, and the flags modifies that function's
         *      behaviour.
         */
        SSL_set_verify(tls_session->ssl, verify_mode, NULL);
        SSL_set_ex_data(tls_session->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF, (void *)conf);
        SSL_set_ex_data(tls_session->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_TLS_SESSION, (void *)tls_session);
 
        tls_session->mtu = conf->fragment_size;
 
        return tls_session;
}
 
/** Create a new server TLS session
 *
 * Configures a new server TLS session, configuring options, setting callbacks etc...
 *
 * @param[in] ctx               to alloc session data in. Should usually be NULL
 *                              unless the lifetime of the session is tied to another
 *                              talloc'd object.
 * @param[in] ssl_ctx           containing the base configuration for this session.
 * @param[in] request           The current #request_t.
 * @param[in] dynamic_mtu       If greater than 100, overrides the MTU configured for the SSL_CTX.
 * @param[in] client_cert       Whether to require a client_cert.
 * @return
 *      - A new session on success.
 *      - NULL on error.
 */
fr_tls_session_t *fr_tls_session_alloc_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, request_t *request, size_t dynamic_mtu, bool client_cert)
{
        fr_tls_session_t        *tls_session = NULL;
        SSL                     *ssl = NULL;
        int                     verify_mode = 0;
        fr_pair_t               *vp;
        fr_tls_conf_t           *conf = fr_tls_ctx_conf(ssl_ctx);
 
        RDEBUG2("Initiating new TLS session");
 
        MEM(tls_session = talloc_zero(ctx, fr_tls_session_t));
 
        ssl = SSL_new(ssl_ctx);
        if (ssl == NULL) {
                talloc_free(tls_session);
                fr_tls_log(request, "Error creating new TLS session");
                return NULL;
        }
        fr_pair_list_init(&tls_session->extra_pairs);
 
        session_init(tls_session);
        tls_session->ctx = ssl_ctx;
        tls_session->ssl = ssl;
        talloc_set_destructor(tls_session, _fr_tls_session_free);
 
        fr_tls_session_request_bind(tls_session->ssl, request); /* Is unbound in this function */
 
        /*
         *      Initialize callbacks
         */
        tls_session->record_init = record_init;
        tls_session->record_close = record_close;
        tls_session->record_from_buff = record_from_buff;
        tls_session->record_to_buff = record_to_buff;
 
        /*
         *      Create & hook the BIOs to handle the dirty side of the
         *      SSL.  This is *very important* as we want to handle
         *      the transmission part.  Now the only IO interface
         *      that SSL is aware of, is our defined BIO buffers.
         *
         *      This means that all SSL IO is done to/from memory,
         *      and we can update those BIOs from the packets we've
         *      received.
         */
        MEM(tls_session->into_ssl = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()));
        MEM(tls_session->from_ssl = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()));
        SSL_set_bio(tls_session->ssl, tls_session->into_ssl, tls_session->from_ssl);
 
        /*
         *      Add the message callback to identify what type of
         *      message/handshake is passed
         */
        SSL_set_msg_callback(ssl, fr_tls_session_msg_cb);
        SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, tls_session);
        SSL_set_info_callback(ssl, fr_tls_session_info_cb);
 
        /*
         *      This sets the context sessions can be resumed in.
         *      This is to prevent sessions being created by one application
         *      and used by another.  In our case it prevents sessions being
         *      reused between modules, or TLS server components such as
         *      RADSEC.
         *
         *      A context must always be set when doing session resumption
         *      otherwise session resumption will fail.
         *
         *      As the context ID must be <= 32, we digest the context
         *      data with sha256.
         *
         *      This seems to only be used for stateful session resumption
         *      not session-tickets
         */
        if (conf->cache.mode != FR_TLS_CACHE_DISABLED) {
                char            *context_id;
                EVP_MD_CTX      *md_ctx;
                uint8_t         digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 
                static_assert(sizeof(digest) <= SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
                              "SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH must be >= SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH");
                fr_assert(conf->cache.id_name);
 
                if (tmpl_aexpand(tls_session, &context_id, request, conf->cache.id_name, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
                        RPEDEBUG("Failed expanding session ID");
                error:
                        fr_tls_session_request_unbind(tls_session->ssl);        /* Was bound in this function */
                        talloc_free(tls_session);
                        return NULL;
                }
 
                MEM(md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create());
                EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
                EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, context_id, talloc_array_length(context_id) - 1);
                EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, digest, NULL);
                EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md_ctx);
                talloc_free(context_id);
 
                if (!fr_cond_assert(SSL_set_session_id_context(tls_session->ssl,
                                                               digest, sizeof(digest)) == 1)) goto error;
        }
 
        /*
         *      Add the session certificate to the session.
         */
        vp = fr_pair_find_by_da(&request->control_pairs, NULL, attr_tls_session_cert_file);
        if (vp) {
                RDEBUG2("Loading TLS session certificate \"%pV\"", &vp->data);
 
                if (SSL_use_certificate_file(tls_session->ssl, vp->vp_strvalue, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1) {
                        fr_tls_log(request, "Failed loading TLS session certificate \"%s\"",
                                      vp->vp_strvalue);
                        goto error;
                }
 
                if (SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(tls_session->ssl, vp->vp_strvalue, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1) {
                        fr_tls_log(request, "Failed loading TLS session certificate \"%s\"",
                                      vp->vp_strvalue);
                        goto error;
                }
 
                if (SSL_check_private_key(tls_session->ssl) != 1) {
                        fr_tls_log(request, "Failed validating TLS session certificate \"%s\"",
                                      vp->vp_strvalue);
                        goto error;
                }
        /*
         *      Better to perform explicit checks, than rely
         *      on OpenSSL's opaque error messages.
         */
        } else {
                if (!conf->chains || !conf->chains[0]->private_key_file) {
                        ERROR("TLS Server requires a private key file");
                        goto error;
                }
 
                if (!conf->chains || !conf->chains[0]->certificate_file) {
                        ERROR("TLS Server requires a certificate file");
                        goto error;
                }
        }
 
        /** Dynamic toggle for allowing disallowing client certs
         *
         * This is mainly used for testing in environments where we can't
         * get test credentials for the host.
         */
        vp = fr_pair_find_by_da(&request->control_pairs, NULL, attr_tls_session_require_client_cert);
        if (vp) client_cert = vp->vp_bool;
 
        /*
         *      In Server mode we only accept.
         *
         *      This sets up the SSL session to work correctly with
         *      fr_tls_session_handshake.
         */
        SSL_set_accept_state(tls_session->ssl);
 
        /*
         *      Verify the peer certificate, if asked.
         */
        if (client_cert) {
                RDEBUG2("Setting verify mode to require certificate from client");
                verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
                verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
                verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
        }
        tls_session->verify_client_cert = client_cert;
 
        SSL_set_verify(tls_session->ssl, verify_mode, fr_tls_verify_cert_cb);
        SSL_set_ex_data(tls_session->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF, (void *)conf);
        SSL_set_ex_data(tls_session->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_TLS_SESSION, (void *)tls_session);
 
        if (conf->client_hello_parse) {
                SSL_CTX_set_client_hello_cb(ssl_ctx, fr_tls_session_client_hello_cb, NULL);
        }
 
        tls_session->mtu = conf->fragment_size;
        if (dynamic_mtu > 100 && dynamic_mtu < tls_session->mtu) {
                RDEBUG2("Setting fragment_len to %zu from dynamic_mtu", dynamic_mtu);
                tls_session->mtu = dynamic_mtu;
        }
 
        if (conf->cache.mode != FR_TLS_CACHE_DISABLED) {
                tls_session->allow_session_resumption = true;   /* otherwise it's false */
                fr_tls_cache_session_alloc(tls_session);
        }
 
        fr_tls_session_request_unbind(tls_session->ssl);        /* Was bound in this function */
 
        return tls_session;
}
 
static unlang_action_t tls_new_session_result(request_t *request, UNUSED void *uctx)
{
        request_t       *parent = request->parent;
 
        fr_assert(parent);
 
        /*
         *      Copy control attributes back to the parent.
         */
        if (fr_pair_list_copy(parent->control_ctx, &parent->control_pairs, &request->control_pairs) < 0) return UNLANG_ACTION_FAIL;
 
        return UNLANG_ACTION_CALCULATE_RESULT;
}
 
unlang_action_t fr_tls_new_session_push(request_t *request, fr_tls_conf_t const *tls_conf)
{
        request_t       *child;
        fr_pair_t       *vp;
 
        MEM(child = unlang_subrequest_alloc(request, dict_tls));
 
        MEM(pair_prepend_request(&vp, attr_tls_packet_type) >= 0);
        vp->vp_uint32 = enum_tls_packet_type_new_session->vb_uint32;
 
        if (unlang_subrequest_child_push(NULL, child, request, true, UNLANG_SUB_FRAME) < 0) {
                talloc_free(child);
                return UNLANG_ACTION_FAIL;
        }
 
        if (unlang_function_push(child,
                                 NULL,
                                 tls_new_session_result,
                                 NULL, 0,
                                 UNLANG_SUB_FRAME, NULL) < 0) {
                talloc_free(child);
                return UNLANG_ACTION_FAIL;
        }
 
        if (unlang_call_push(NULL, child, tls_conf->virtual_server, UNLANG_SUB_FRAME) < 0) {
                talloc_free(child);
                return UNLANG_ACTION_FAIL;
        }
 
        return UNLANG_ACTION_PUSHED_CHILD;
}
#endif /* WITH_TLS */